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BRINGING COUNSEL IN FROM THE COLD:
RECONCILING ETHICAL RULES WITH THE
QUAGMIRE OF INSURANCE DEFENSE PRACTICE
Joseph Regalia* and V. Andrew Cass"

Litigators have a tough job: demanding clients, relentless
deadlines, and constant pressure to get everythingjust right. But
insurance defense attorneys deal with this and more. Being an
insurance-defense attorney means satisfying two masters: the
insurancecompany thatpays the bills, and the insuredwho stands
to lose if the case turns out badly. This is not merely a matter of
having to field more phone calls and emails-insurancedefense
practice poses profound ethical dilemmas not adequately
addressedby the existing rules of professional conduct. It is into
this ethical morass that we will dive. Ourproposedsolution is to
bringsome light to the darkness in theform ofspecific ethicalrules
for insurance defense attorneys. To illustrate why change is
needed, this article examines at length one of the most common
(and yet unanswered) ethical dilemmas in this area: conflicts
among insurance companies with competing interests in a case.
After thoroughly reviewing the scant existing ethicalguidance on
this topic, we conclude that the sensible answer is a new set of
ethical rules that will give more guidance to everyone involved.
We finish with a first stab: a proposed ethical framework
governing the insurer conflict we explore in this article. But this is
only thefirst step. More thought and solutions are needed to plug
the cost and uncertainty in this corner of legal ethics.
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4. Conclusion: we just don't know.....
.............. 483
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INTRODUCTION

Litigators have a tough job: demanding clients, relentless deadlines, and
constant pressure to get everything just right. But insurance defense attorneys deal
with this and more. Being an insurance-defense attorney means satisfying two
masters: the insurance company that pays the bills, and the insured. This is not
merely a matter of having to field lots of phone calls-insurance defense practice
poses profound ethical dilemmas not adequately addressed by the existing rules of
professional conduct. It is into this ethical morass that we will dive.
Law library shelves strain under the weight of cases and law review articles
about the ethical minefield created by the tripartite relationship-the three-party
relationship created when a liability insurer retains an attorney to defend its insured.
Despite this attention, and despite the frequency of these issues, insurance defense
counsel in most jurisdictions are left without meaningful guidance on some
important issues. This void creates uncertainty and cost to insurers, insureds, and
insurance defense counsel; and, because of the pervasive role of liability insurance
in every aspect of our lives-these costs ultimately are bome by consumers, that is,
all of us.
Our primary purpose here is not to offer a silver bullet, but instead, to start
a discussion about strategies for better combatting this glaring problem. We suggest
that more specific ethical rules are needed in this area, but we do not propose a set
of rules that are particularly favorable to any one group-insureds, insurers, or the
attorneys themselves. We simply propose that everyone involved would benefit from
more specific guidance for lawyers practicing insurance defense, in supplementation
to the one-size-fits-all approach of the current ethical rules. We have some
suggestions, but our goal is elucidation, not prescription.
Having a single set of uniform ethical rules governing all attorneys
regardless of practice area has long been accepted as the best system. The consensus
has been that this uniformity prevents the practice of law from fracturing and ensures
that judges and state bar officials can easily apply the same set of rules. We don't
suggest a total upheaval of the American approach to ethics; we merely suggest a
refinement of the rules when it comes to insurance defense practice.
Enacting particularized rules for specific practice areas is not
unprecedented. For example, special ethical rules govern attorneys working for the
government. Special rules also govern criminal defense attorneys who represent
codefendants. And some scholars have advocated for increasing the number of
practice-specific rules in other contexts. But whether states adopt these suggested
reforms or not, we should at least consider creating some specific standards for
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insurance defense practitioners. The cost of leaving these attorneys in an ethical
minefield is simply too high.
We explore this area in three steps. First, we discuss the landscape for
specialized ethical rules in general. Second, we consider the need for more
specialized rules in the insurance defense context. In this section, which makes up
the bulk of this article, we use a common ethical issue in insurance defense practice
as a case study to demonstrate why specialized rules might be helpful. After
reviewing this case study, and concluding that specialized ethical rules are preferred
in the insurance defense arena, we propose a model regulatory framework as a first
step in creating a solution.
Our case study is an ethical dilemma faced by insurance defense attorneys
daily. An attorney is hired by Insurance Company A to defend an insured who is in
a lawsuit over a car accident. Insurance Company A is one of the attorney's best
clients, from whom he receives a steady stream of cases. Our attorney's investigation
reveals good news-another driver not yet a party to the lawsuit may have
contributed to the accident. This revelation has the potential to shift the blame, and
all or part of the financial responsibility, onto the shoulders of the new potential party
and his insurer. But, only after joining the new party to the lawsuit as a third-party
defendant does our defense counsel learn that the insurer footing the bill on the other
side is his second-best client, Insurance Company B. That seems like a problem: two
major clients with two sets of diverging interests in this case. Does counsel have a
conflict?
Technically, Insurance Company B is not a party to the case, so our
attorney's client is not directly adverse to Insurance Company B. But at the same
time, he is pursuing a claim against Company B's insured, which means this insurer
will foot the bill, initially for the defense, and possibly later for indemnity. Does that
make his client's interests adverse to those of Insurance Company B? And if that
alone does not create a conflict, what if during settlement negotiations, Insurance
Company B fails to step up and adequately contribute, thereby forcing the case to
trial and exposing both carriers' insureds to potential liability in excess of their
liability limits? Can defense counsel call out Insurance Company B for recklessly
exposing its insured? Will defense counsel find himself holding back out of concern
he will upset Insurance Company B? What does defense counsel need to reveal about
all of this to the insured, Insurance Company A, or even Insurance Company B?
Where are the boundaries? Unfortunately, as we will see, even this frequent and nottoo-complex scenario is unanswered by existing ethical rules (at least in most
jurisdictions).
I.

BACKGROUND TO THE USE OF SPECIALIZED ETHICAL
STANDARDS

Lawyers within a particular jurisdiction are all generally regulated by a
single set of uniform ethical rules, regardless of their specific practice area. These
rules, which are typically created by state supreme courts and enforced by state bars,
are modeled in most jurisdictions on the American Bar Association's Model Rules.'

1. See Mark J. Fucile, River Pilot: Local Counsel in an Age of National Litigation, DRI FOR THE
DEF., Mar. 2015, at 76 (noting that "most states now use professional rules based on the ABA Model
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The touchstone for any analysis of ethical rules is thus, in most states, the Model
Rules.
The consensus, as adopted by the Model Rules, has long been that holding
attorneys in all practice areas to a uniform set of ethical standards is usually the most
sensible way to regulate attorneys. 2 The bar has a deep-rooted belief that the legal
profession is unified and that holding attorneys to different rules, just because they
practice in different arenas, is not only unnecessary but harmful to the profession's
image.3 The Model Rules seem to take this approach. Indeed, this commitment to a
unified approach to legal ethics is so strong that there has been relatively little said
about whether the perspective still makes sense.
Although the Model Rules and many jurisdictions have adhered to a largely
unified approach, some others have questioned whether a single set of rules makes
sense. As these scholars and lawyers have acknowledged: the practice of law is quite
stratified already-perhaps practice-specific rules might not be beyond the pale. 4
This has led some scholars to question whether a one-size-fits-all ethical standard

Rules"); see also Hart v. Gaioni, 261 F. App'x 66, 68 (9th Cir. 2007); Miller v. State, 764 S.E.2d 135,
141 (Ga. 2014); Chauhan v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst. Inc., 12 Mass.L.Rptr. 659 (Feb. 28, 2001); In re

Application of Cnty. of Bergen, 633 A.2d 1017, 1020 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Shelby Cnty.
Gov't v. City ofMemphis, No. W2014-02197-COA-T1OB-CV, 2015 WL 127895, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Jan. 8, 2015); State v. McLeod, No. 50604-8-1, 2003 WL 21907636 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2003).
2. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1147, 1148-49 (1993) ("Moreover, by resting their respective claims on rules that purport
to be both general and universally applicable, both sides can tap into one of the legal profession's most
important constitutive beliefs: that it is a single profession bound together by unique and specialized norms
and practices distinct from the norms and practices of laypeople. For the government, the image of a
unitary legal community supports the claim that lawyers, as 'learned professionals,' have a unique
responsibility to place principle before profit." (footnote omitted)); see also Jack R. Bierig, Whatever
Happenedto ProfessionalSelf-Regulation?, 69 A.B.A. J. 616 (1983).
3.

Bruce A. Green, Foreword:RationingLawyers: Ethical and ProfessionalIssues in the Delivery

ofLegal Services to Low-Income Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1713, 1718 & n.24 (1999) (reflecting on
the bars' "commitment to the principle that the legal profession is a unified profession with a universally
applicable set of professional norms"); Dana A. Remus, Out ofPractice:The Twenty-First Century Legal
Profession, 63 DUKE L. J. 1243, 1245 (2014) (discussing the approach to ethics consisting of "a single,
broadly applicable code of conduct"); see Wilkins, supra note 2, at 1218-19 ("By suppressing undeniably
relevant differences among types of lawyers, the argument runs, uniform rules of professional
responsibility foster a feeling of communal solidarity across the entire profession."); Fred C. Zacharias,
FederalizingLegal Ethics, 73 TEx. L. REV. 335, 385-86 (1994) (noting the ethics codes' "basic approach
of considering lawyers' duties to be uniform, whatever role the lawyer plays").
4.

See,

e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ &

EDWARD

0. LAUMANN,

CHICAGO LAWYERS:

THE SOCIAL

STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 3 (1982) ("I[t has been] apparent for some time that the simple view of the bar
as a single, unified profession no longer fits the facts."); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT:
WHO'S IN CHARGE? 146-48 (1974) (discussing the differences between the lawyer-client relationship in
personal injury practice and in corporate defense practice); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND HIS
COMMUNITY 147-55 (1967) (arguing that lawyers in a midsized midwestern city have different ethical
commitments from lawyers in Chicago or New York); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realismfor Lawyers, 104
HARv. L. REV. 468, 515-18 (1990).
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still makes sense today.5 Indeed, some commentators question whether this uniform
approach was ever justified. 6
Thus far, a few scholars have suggested that specialized ethical rules are
needed in a few narrow areas, such as collaborative lawyering, capital criminal
defense, juvenile justice, and elder law.' The most heated debates have been over
whether more specialized rules are needed for attorneys practicing in criminal law.8
Bars and legislatures have taken note of some of these arguments, incorporating
specialized rules for a handful of practices such as government attorneys and
securities practitioners. But all in all, the advocates of specialized ethical codes have
made little headway.
With this article we hope to add one more data point for the argument that
specialized ethical rules in some practice areas make sense. To be clear: whether
specialized ethical rules should be adopted in all (or even many) practice areas is
beyond the scope of this article. What we do hope to show is that the increased cost
and uncertainty faced by practitioners and their clients in the insurance defense arena
warrant targeted ethical governance. This brings us to the heart of this article: Why
specific ethical regulation is desperately needed in insurance defense.

5. See, e.g., Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation ofLawyers Post-Enron,37 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 1017, 1144 (2004) ("Manipulation, motivated by politics and self-interest, of the ideology
of the bar to adhere to rules of ethics predicated on an antiquated and no longer realistic model of a unified
profession has likewise been counterproductive."); Rebecca Roiphe, A History ofProfessionalism:Julius
Henry Cohen andthe Professionsas a Route to Citizenship, 40 FORDHAM URB. L J. 33,74 (2012) (arguing
that the "unified profession" is a "myth").
6. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 54 (1986) (noting that the idea that "all lawyers
are sufficiently homogeneous to conform to common standards ... was probably unfounded in 1908").
7. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, Why We Still Need a Model Rule for Collaborative Law: A
Reply to Professor Lande, OHIO ST. L.J. ON DisP. RESOL. 707 (2007) (advocating special standards for
collaborative lawyering); David R. Katner, The Ethical Struggle of Usurping Juvenile Client Autonomy
by Raising Competency in Delinquency and Criminal Cases, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 293, 323 (2007)
(representing juveniles); Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the
Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008) (national security
lawyers); see also Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, Conflict ofInterest and Competency Issues in Law
ClinicPractice, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 493, 498-99 (2002) (public interest practice); Jan Ellen Rein, Clients
with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices-What's an Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the

Competency Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1153 (1994) (elder law attorneys); cf Jack B.
Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 471 (1994) (mass tort
cases); Richard E. Crouch, The Matter ofBombers: Unfair Tactics andtheProblemofDefining Unethical
Behavior in Divorce Litigation, 20 FAM. L. Q. 413, 435-38 (1986) (matrimonial practice); Nancy B.
Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR.

INST. L. REV. 45 (1998); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of ProfessionalConductfor the
Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993) (corporate and securities practice).
8. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias,ReconceptualizingEthicalRoles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169, 190
(1997).
9. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 292.3 (2011) (providing ethical standards for practicing immigration law
before the Immigration and Naturalization Service); 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2011) (prescribing regulations for
tax practitioners before the IRS); Standards of Practicefor Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes, 18
FAM. L.Q. 363 (1984); Code of Ethics of the Association of Representatives of Professional Athletes

(prescribing rules of conduct for attorneys representing professional athletes), reprinted in Robert E.
Fraley & F. Russell Harwell, Ethics and the Sports Lawyer: A Comprehensive Approach, 13 J. LEGAL
PROF. 9, 88-95 (1988).
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Getting to know the ethics of insurance defense

"Insurance defense" is a broad term used to describe litigation practice
involving attorneys hired by insurance companies to defend their insureds against
claims potentially covered under insurance policies.10 Although insurance defense
often brings to mind the defense of personal injury litigation, this world spans a broad
spectrum of claims." What these cases have in common is a complex web of
relationships and ethical pitfalls. This is because litigation triggering a defense under
a policy of liability insurance engrafts onto the traditional "two party" litigation
model at least one more interested party: the insurer. 1 2
To fully appreciate these complications, one must first understand the
relationships between insurers, insureds, and defense counsel. In the most common
case, an insurer has a policy with an insured requiring that the insurer defend a court
case in which liability for claims might fall within the policy. With its obligation to
defend triggered, the insurer hires counsel to defend the insured. But the insurer does
not just pay the bills-it typically stays actively involved with the case. Insurers often
control aspects of the litigation, such as by requiring the defense counsel to work
within certain parameters set out in the insurer's guidelines and (under many
policies) maintaining the exclusive right to settle the plaintiffs claims against the
insured." Indeed, any insurance defense lawyer will tell you that one of the central
requirements for a long stay on an insurer's panel list is complying with carrier
reporting requirements, a task which occupies a large part of every practitioner's
work load. Insurers use reports from defense counsel, along with their own
independent investigation, to stay carefully apprised of everything that goes on.
Insurers after all are in the business of managing risk, and liability insurance involves
the handicapping of potential trial outcomes to set reserves (required by state
insurance regulators) and make informed and rational decisions about settlement and
trial. Liability insurers also closely monitor the evolution of the underlying factual
record to consider whether emerging facts, theories of liability, and defenses bring
the insured's potential exposure to liability into or outside of the policy's coverage.14

10. For a discussion of issues unique to insurance law, see generally Robert E. O'Malley, Ethics
Principlesfor the Insurer, the Insured, andDefense Counsel: The EternalTriangle Reformed, 66 TUL. L.

REV. 511 (1991).
11.

See generally, Herbert M. Kritzer, Betwixt and Between: The Ethical Dilemmas of Insurance
&

Defense 132, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT (Leslie C. Levin

Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (noting that insurance defense attorneys handle claims other than those involving
personal injury litigation).

12. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excess Ins. Co., C.A. No. 94-0614B, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19882,
at *16 (D.R.I. June 1, 1995) ("While K&T states it represented only the insureds and not Prudential
directly, it has been held that where there is no dispute between an insurer and insured, 'as a fundamental
proposition a defense lawyer is counsel to both the insurer and the insured. He owes to each a duty to
preserve the confidences and secrets imparted to him during the course of representation."' (quoting Gray
v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 468 A.2d 721, 725 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983)).
13. Some policies, including commonly professional liability defense policies, require the insurer to
obtain the consent of the insured in order to settle. Moreover, in some jurisdictions where the insurer is
providing a defense under reservation of rights, control over whether to settle or not vests not with the
insurer, but exclusively with the insured.
14. See Parsons v. Cont'l Nat'l Am. Grp., 550 P.2d 94 (Ariz. 1976).
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Insurers often hire counsel to represent their insureds from a "panel"-a list
of preferred firms. 15 Insurers use this go-to list of panel counsel because they offer
cost-effective service, comply with the insurer's litigation guidelines, and offer
quality work product.1 6 It is not uncommon for panel counsel and insurers to have
strong relationships, sometimes spanning decades and involving many different
insureds over the years." With larger firms, these relationships often include
defending claims across practice and geographical areas. The work of many panel
attorneys and firms will frequently go beyond the defense of the insurer's insureds,
to include the defense of the insurance company itself in bad faith and other claims
8
related to alleged failures to pay out insurance benefits.
Indeed, the close-knit relationship between defense counsel and insurance
companies has spawned a growing area of scholarship relating to "captive" counsel;
the wide spread use of billing guidelines and billing audits; and the question of who,
as between the insurer and the insured, has the right to "control the defense."19
Despite these areas of tension, insurers and their defense counsel continue to have
close relationships.2 0
This web of multi-lateral relationships is a large cause of the ethical
dilemmas which characterize insurance defense.2 1 Every jurisdiction treats the
insurer/insured/attorney relationship slightly differently, twisting the ethical inquiry

15.

See 2 CHRISTOPHER K. PFIRRMAN & MICHAEL DEMARCO, SUCCESFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN

INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL

§ 25:18

(discussing the practice of selecting "panel counsel").

16. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Enhancingthe Socially InstrumentalRole ofInsurance: The Opportunity
and Challenge Presentedby the ALI Restatement Position on Breach of the Duty to Defend, 5 UC IRVINE

L. REV. 587, 599 (2015) ("Typically, rates paid to insurer-selected panel counsel are significantly
lower ... insurers have largely succeeded in negotiating lower rates than those paid by policyholders for
counsel competent to defend most claims due to the insurer's ability to provide a high volume of repeat
business in return."); James L. Cornell & Trevor B. Hall, What Every Business Lawyer Should Know
About the InsuranceCarrier'sDuty to Defend and the Policyholder's Right to Select Counsel, 42 TEX. J.

BUS. L. 237, at 241 (2007) (explaining that "[i]n the usual case, carriers have 'panel counsel' with whom
they have established relationships, many times spanning years, and to whom they refer multiple cases or
even entire books of business in exchange for reduced hourly rates and adherence to 'litigation
guidelines'); Daniel M. Martinez, Insurance Companies Use of "Captive" or in-House Counsel to
Represent Insureds Constitutes the UnauthorizedPracticeofLaw: Is American Home the Right Decision

for Texas?, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1007, 1026 (2003) (discussing trend of insurers using "captive" or house
counsel for cost efficiency reasons).
17. See Cornell, supra note 16, at 241; see also Kritzer, supra note 11, at 135 (2012) (noting that
insurance defense attorneys "rely on repeat business from a relatively small number of sources").
18. See Kritzer, supra note 11, at 135.
19. See Michael D. Morrison & James R. Old, Jr., Economics, Exigencies andEthics:Whose Choice?
Emerging Trends and Issues in Texas InsuranceDefense Practice, 53 BAYLORL. REV. 349, 392 (2001);

William W. Hurst et al., Can Insurance Defense Firms Be Ethically Replaced by Staff Counsel? Ruling
Says Use ofStaff Counsel Constitutes UPL, RES GESTAE, Aug. 1998, at 42, 42-44.
20. See Paula-Jane Seidman & John S. (Jack) Pierce, A ContinuingCrisis: Casualties on Both Sides
in the Unholy War Between Insurers and the Defense Bar over Issues of Staff Counsel, Legal Audits and

Billing Guidelines, in INSURANCE LAW 2000: UNDERSTANDING THE ABCs 479,485-86 (2000); Douglas
R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle ofInsuranceDefense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 481
(1996).
21. See Kritzer, supra note 11, at 137; Douglas R. Richmond, Walking a Tightrope: The Tripartite
RelationshipBetween Insurer, Insured, and InsuranceDefense Counsel, 73 NEB. L. REV. 265, 271 (1994)

(discussing relationships that create common conflicts in insurance-related disputes).

Summer 2018

BRINGING COUNSEL IN FROM THE COLD

459

so that no one can be sure what may cross the ethical line.22 One notable commentator
in this area, Nathan Anderson, has noted that the rules surrounding insurance defense
litigation "fail to provide clear and defensible answers to the most basic questions"
such as when the attorney-client relationship exists.23 Anderson goes on to explain
that "[c]onsequently, 'the obvious danger is that insurance defense lawyers will act
improperly, even when they attempt to adhere to the law."'2 4
For example, does a lawyer paid by an insurance company to defend an
insured even have an attorney-client relationship with the insurer? Or is the insurer
a mere "payor" of legal services? This is an important distinction because some
ethical duties only apply when an insurer becomes a "client" of an attorney. Whether
defending an insured creates an attomey-client relationship with an insurer is settled
in many states, but surprisingly for such a fundamental concern, this remains an open
question in many jurisdictions, with states, and even individual ethics opinions,
taking slightly different approaches. 25
Like many other ethical questions that arise for insurance defense counsel,
the uniform ethical rules provide little help. For example, there is nothing in the
Model Rules that says that paying for an insured's representation creates an attorneyclient relationship with the insurer. Nor are there any rules providing guidance about
when a third party, like an insurer, can take on client-like status by virtue of
controlling some aspects of the insured's representation. The truth is, the
insurer/insured/attorney relationship is an anomaly, and the uniform ethical rules are
of little help. Consequently, everyone is left to the uncertainty of divining what they
can from ethics opinions or other guidance (which often turns out to be wrong).
In some jurisdictions, the insurer is not automatically a "client" merely
because it pays the bills for an insured's representation. 26 But other jurisdictions may
find an attorney-client relationship between the attorney and the insurer in such a
situation. 27 And in some jurisdictions, it's hard to tell what the rule is. All that said,

22. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 510, 519 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ("The
attorney-client relationship is more complex in the context of insurance litigation - . . courts have
recognized that a unique tripartite relationship exists among [the insurer and the insured] and the defense
counsel hired to defend against third-party liability.").
23. Nathan Andersen, Risky Business: Attorney Liability in Insurance Defense Litigation-A Review
of the Arizona Supreme Court's Decision in ParadigmInsurance Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 2002

BYU L. REV. 643, 644 & n. 52 (2002) (quoting Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional
Responsibilities ofInsurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE LJ 255, 263 (1995)).
24. Id. at 644 (quoting Silver & Syverud, supra note 23, at 263).
25. See id. at 644 ("[T]he rules [surrounding insurance defense litigation] fail to provide clear and
defensible answers to the most basic questions, such as whether an attorney-client relationship exists
between the insurance company and the lawyer retained to handle the lawsuit against the insured." (second
alteration in original) (quoting Silver & Syverud, supra note 23, at 263)).
26. In fact, some courts have created a special rule in not finding direct conflicts with insurers even
if they are considered "clients" in the jurisdiction. See N. Sacca & Sons, Inc. v. E. Coast Excavators, Inc.,
1992 Mass. App. Div. 6, 7 (1992) (declining to disqualify a lawyer from adversity to an insurance carrier
even though the lawyer had represented the insurance carrier, because the carrier was "secondary"); Tank
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1986); Arden v. Forsberg & Umlauf, P.S., 373 P.3d
320, 327 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
27. See Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1995)
(applying Alaska law); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Superior Court of Orange Cty., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526 (Ct.
App. 2013); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 24 (Ct. App. 1999);
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the trend to find an attorney-client relationship in this situation appears to be
catching. 28 One illustrative case is State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
FederalInsurance Co. 29 There, the California Court of Appeal applied California's
concurrent-conflict rule, Rule 3-3 10.30 The attorney was retained by an insurance
company to represent an insured in one action.3 1 In a second action, the attorney, on
behalf of another client, filed a complaint against that insurance company in an

Unigard Ins. Grp. v. O'Flaherty & Belgum, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565, 568-69 (Ct. App. 1995); Nandorf, Inc.
v. CNA Ins. Cos., 479 N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); McCourt Co. v. FPC Props., Inc., 434 N.E.2d
1234, 1235 (Mass. 1982); Nev. Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct ex rel. Cty. of Clark, 152
P.3d 737, 741 (Nev. 2007); Gray v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 468 A.2d 721, 725 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1983); Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 UT 39, ¶ 5 78 P.3d 603, 606. But see
Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bronson Plating Co., 496 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd 519
N.W.2d 864 (Mich. 1994), overruled by Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 786 (Mich.
2003); Great Am. E & S Ins. Co. v. Quintairos, P.A., 2009-CT-01063-SCT (Miss. 2012); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 357 P.3d 338, 340-41 (Nev. 2015).
28. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bourlon, 617 S.E.2d 40, 46-48 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) ("In
construing the effect of the tripartite relationship between an attorney, an insurer, and an insured, several
courts across the country have held that the 'common interest' or 'joint client' doctrine applies. Under this
doctrine, communications between the insured and the retained attorney are not privileged to the extent
that they relate to the defense for which the insurer has retained the attorney. . . . In light of the foregoing,
we are persuaded that the common interest or joint client doctrine applies to the context of insurance
litigation in North Carolina. Therefore, where, as here, an insurance company retains counsel for the
benefit of its insured, those communications related to the representation and directed to the retained
attorney by the insured are not privileged as between the insurer and the insured. Nevertheless, we note
that application of the common interest or joint client doctrine does not lead to the conclusion that all of
the communications between defendant and Patterson were unprivileged. Instead, the attorney-client
privilege still attaches to those communications unrelated to the defense of the underlying action, as well
as those communications regarding issues adverse between the insurer and the insured. Specifically,
'communications that relate to an issue of coverage . . . are not discoverable . . . because the interests of
the insurer and its insured with respect to the issue of coverage are always adverse.' . . . [W]e are not
persuaded that the trial court erred by concluding that Patterson was prohibited from providing the file to
plaintiff in a wholesale manner. As discussed above, some communications contained in the file may have
been privileged, including those communications unrelated to the underlying action or defendant's
counterclaims, those communications regarding coverage issues made prior to defendant's counterclaims,
and those communications unrelated to the conduct forming the basis of defendant's counterclaims.
Therefore, we agree that Patterson's file should not have been provided to plaintiff in a wholesale manner.
Instead, the file should have been submitted to the trial court for in camera review aimed at determining
which documents in the file were privileged. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
ruling that Patterson breached his attorney-client relationship with defendant when he provided plaintiff
with the entire file from the underlying action.") (alteration in original) (quoting N. River Ins. Co. v. Phila.
Reinsurance Corp. 797 F. Supp 363, 367 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 625 S.E.2d 779 (N.C. 2006); see also State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 24 (Ct. App. 1999) (assessing a situation
in which a law firm hired by defendant Federal Insurance to represent one of its insureds simultaneously
sued Federal Insurance on behalf of State Farm in a completely unrelated matter). In State Farm, the court
noted that the law firm was simultaneously representing one of Federal Insurance's insureds while
representing State Farm in a lawsuit against Federal Insurance for three months. See id. This being so, the
court disqualified the law firm from its representation of State Farm adverse to Federal Insurance,
explaining the California position that a law firm representing an insured has a "triangular" arrangement
in which the law firm also is deemed to represent the insurance company. See id.
29. 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20 (Ct. App. 1999).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 22.
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unrelated matter.32 The court concluded that the insurer was a client of the attorney
based on the attorney's representation of its insured.
Interestingly, this was so even though nothing in the state's ethical rules
implied that an attorney-client relationship existed. This meant that the attorney
could not represent the second client, who was taking an adverse position against the
insurer by filing a complaint against it.3 4 And the attorney had risked his own ethical
compliance by even taking the case. Indeed, courts have pointed out that the uniform
ethical rules do not address this issue:
Concededly, it can be said that "[t]hese interrelationships among a liability
insurer, its insured, and the attorney chosen by the insurer to represent the insured,
are sui generis. The canons and disciplinary rules do not address themselves frankly
and explicitly to this special set of relationships, and there is awkwardness in
attempts to apply the canons and rules." . . . [T]his ambiguity exists only as to

instances of a conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured, which raise the
question of the lawyer's primary allegiance.
Now, insurers could create their own affirmative attorney-client
relationships through contract by stating that the attorney has taken on a
representation role.3 6 But even so, as we explain below, what loyalties the attorney
will owe the insurer, and the potential conflicts between insurer and insured-create
an ethical quagmire all their own.
Determining whether an insurer and defense counsel even have an attorneyclient relationship is merely a threshold issue. Whether a client or mere payor, what
ethical challenge is posed by the fact that the insurer is footing the bill for the
insured's representation? And what is counsel to do when the insurer seeks to control
or even just guide defense counsel? At what point is the attorney improperly taking
direction from a third party about the representation? Ethical rules generally give
some guidance for when third parties pay for legal bills, but they don't address the
unique situation present when that third party is a very involved insurance company,
which ultimately may be responsible for paying the judgment which might be entered
against the insured, and which generally to one degree or another controls the
settlement purse strings.

32. Id. at
33. Id. at 23-25.
34. Id. at 22-27; see also Flatt v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (1994).
35. Gray v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 468 A.2d 721, 724-26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (first
alteration in original) (quoting Moritz v. Med. Protective Co., 428 F.Supp. 865, 872 (W.D. Wis. 1977)).
36. See Cont. Cas. Co. v. Huizar, 740 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Tex. 1987); Richmond, supra note 21, at 269
("Because of its financial interest in the effective resolution of a claim, the insurer has a contractual right
to control its insured's defense."); Matthew L. Sweeney, Note, Tank v. State Farm: Conducting a
Reservation of Rights Defense in Washington, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 139, 163 (1987) ("When
defending unconditionally, the insurer has complete control of the defense.").
37. See, e.g., Kritzer, supra, note 11, at 137.
38. See generally Roman M. Roszkewycz, Third Party Payment of Criminal Defense Fees: What
Lawyers Should Tell Potential Clients and Their Benefactors Pursuant to (an Amended) Model Rule

1.8(f), 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 573, 575 (1993), for a discussion on attorney procedure in potential
conflicts during a tripartite claim.
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The ethical elephant in the room: conflicts of interest

The term "conflict of interest" is attributed to the New Testament, and
Matthew's proscription that "no man can serve two masters." 39 And this issue is one
of the most complex and difficult ethical quandries for defense counsel.
A.

The Model Rules and conflicts of interest

Attorneys owe their clients a duty of undivided loyalty. 40 The Model Rules,
and virtually all states, break conflicts of interest into two broad categories: conflicts
related to current clients and conflicts related to former clients. 4 1
Whether there is a concurrent conflict is measured in two ways: by a
standard of "adverse" clients and also by a complementary standard of "impaired
representation."42 The Model Rules set out a standard for each type of concurrent
conflict, as well as some specific rules for curing conflicts in some situations:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of
interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by
one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the
same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in
43
writing.
This Rule thus requires the lawyer to: 1) identify the clients; 2) determine
whether a conflict exists; 3) decide whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so,
consult with the clients affected." The comments to this rule explain that "[a] conflict
39. Joseph F. Johnston Jr., Natural Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Business Managers, 8 J.
MARKETS & MORALITY 27, 29 (2005); see also Blaine F. Aikin & Kristina A. Fausti, Fiduciary: A
HistoricallySignificant Standard, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 155, 157-158 (2010).
40. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
41. See id.; id. r. 1.8.
42. "Even though the simultaneous representations may have nothing in common, and there is no risk
that confidences to which counsel is a party in one case have any relation to the other matter,
disqualification may nevertheless be required." Flatt v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 542 (Cal.
1994).
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
44. See id.
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of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the
representation must be declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of
each client under the conditions of paragraph (b)." 45
Critically, under the adverse conflict prong, "a lawyer may not act as an
advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter,
even when the matters are wholly unrelated." 46 More importantly, a conflict arises
whenever two of an attorney's clients are "directly adverse" to each other-not
merely when two clients areformally named as parties in a litigation againsteach
other.47

The fact that a conflict can exist under the "directly adverse" standard even
when a lawyer's current client is not a named party in litigation-is crucial to this
article. If there were a bright line rule, insurance defense lawyers would never need
to worry about a conflict. If the insurer is a party, they would have a conflict; if not,
they would not. But the ethical rules make this situation more complicated.
The Model Rules explain that direct adversity is not limited to adversity
between clients named in litigation because "[t]he client as to whom the
representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage
to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's ability to represent
the client effectively." 48 There is no talismanic rule that allows a facile determination
of whether a disqualifying conflict of interest exists. Instead, "[t]he potential for
conflict requires a careful analysis of the parties' respective interests to determine
whether they can be reconciled . . . or whether an actual conflict of interest precludes

insurer-appointed defense counsel from presenting a quality defense for the
insured. "4
In general, current client vs. current client litigation is a direct conflict per
se.

50

The difference in their interests is an inevitable aspect of the unilinear, winlose nature of litigation-one client will lose to the extent that the other gains. The
clients are clearly antagonistic in economic terms or, more broadly stated, in terms
of their expressed preferences given their contending positions in the litigation in
question.5 1

No other nation has such an aggressive, per se conflict of interest rule. 52

45. Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 3.
46. Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 6.
47. Id. r. 1.7(a)(1).
48. Id.
49. Johnny Parker, The Expansion of Defense Counsel Liability to Include Malpractice Claims by
Insurance Companies: How the West Was Won, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 33, 51 (2010) (alteration
in original) (quoting Gulf Ins. Co. v. Berger, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 546 (Ct. App. 2000)); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
50. See Charles W. Wolfram, Competitor and Other Finite-Pie Conflicts, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539,
546-47 (2007).
51. Id. at 547.
52. Daniel J. Bussel, No Conflict, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 207, 209-11 (2012) ("This rule is unique
to the American legal profession; no other profession imposes a comparable restriction.... Similarly,
neither accountants, nor bankers, nor brokers, nor clergy are precluded from concurrently advising or
representing parties in unrelated matters that are adverse to one another. A rabbi may counsel one
congregant about ritual religious matters while also counseling another congregant, who happens to be
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Aside from client vs. client litigation, the Model Rules are far from clear on
what constitutes "direct[] advers[ity] to another client."5 3 There are some obvious
areas where "direct adversity" exists and a conflict arises. But figuring out the
marginal cases is notoriously tough.5 4 As explained by one commentator: "The
decisions themselves-those of both courts and bar association ethics committeeshave sometimes been quite unhelpful in providing a definition of the term 'directly
adverse'""' Even the comments to the Model Rules highlight the uncertain, factual
nature of this inquiry: "[w]hether clients are aligned directly against each other
within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context. "56
Also complicating the definition of adversity is that some states have
departed from the model rules in their adversity definitions." In California, for
example, the 1992 amendments to the California Bar's Rules of Professional
Conduct expanded the realm of impermissible conflicts to include the representation
of a client adverse to another client the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter. 8
Before 1992, the relevant rule read differently.59
As noted above, a concurrent conflict of interest may arise in situations
other than simply bringing a claim against a current client. A disqualifying conflict
can also arise where the attorney has some other interest-whether it be personal,
financial, or professional-that materially limits the attorney's ability to represent a
current client. 60 The Rules explain that even merely cross-examining a current client
is likely to suffice-even if the client is not in the action. 6 1 Some ethics opinions in
some jurisdictions have held that merely seeking discovery against a current client

the first congregant's business partner, about a dispute involving the two partners without obtaining
written waivers. A real estate broker may represent a buyer in one transaction while representing that
buyer's seller in another. An accountant may concurrently serve one client in one corporate transaction as
a corporate advisor while rendering unrelated tax advice or providing expert testimony in an unrelated
matter on behalf of a competing bidder. And bankers would be astonished and appalled to hear that, by
virtue of financing one firm, the bank was precluded from rendering advice or financing to a competitor
in an unrelated transaction in which the first borrower happened to be interested in some way.").
53. See id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (AM. BARASS'N 2016)) (indicating
that the model rules and commentary merely state that the facts must be considered).
54. For example, the ABA Ethics Committee's consideration of "adversity" has been inconsistent.
Compare, e.g., ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-434 (2004) ("[O]rdinarily
there is no conflict of interest when a lawyer undertakes an engagement by a testator to disinherit a
beneficiary whom the lawyer represents on unrelated matters."), and ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Profl
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995) (giving a very limited scope to the concept of "adverse"
representation in of corporations), with, e.g., ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal
Op. 97-406 (1997) (taking a much more broad view of "adverse interest" that can create a conflict).
55. Wolfram, supra note 50, at 546.
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 17 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
57. See Ze-ev Eiger & Brandy Rutan, Conflicts of Interest: Attorneys Representing Parties with
Adverse Interests in the Same Commercial Transaction, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 945, 949-52 (2001)

(providing specific examples of differences in California and New York).
58. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3-310(C)(3) (STATE BAR OF CAL. 2017).
59. See id. r. 3-310(D). Other states have also created unique definition of adversity, including New
York, Texas, the District of Columbia, and Florida.
60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016); see also Bussel, supra
note 52.
61. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
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can create a concurrent conflict.62 "On the other hand, simultaneous representation
in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such
as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not
ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the
respective clients." 63 Further, the mere fact that an attorney may be advocating a
legal position that could create negative precedent for an attorney's other clients is
not a conflict unless "there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of
one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another
client in a different case.""4
For example, there may be a conflict where the recovery of one client is at
the expense of recovery of another. In Ferrarav. JordacheEnters. Inc., the court
disqualified an attorney from representing both the driver of a bus that was in a traffic
accident and the matron on the bus. 65 The court noted that dual driver-passenger
representation is prohibited because it is likely that the passenger will interpose
counterclaims against the driver, thus pitting the two clients against each other. 66
The model rules explain: "A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is
a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit
the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case." 67 It gives
as an example "when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to
seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client" with a number of
open-ended factors to consider. 68 Another source of guidance on concurrent conflicts
is the Restatement (Third) of The Law GoverningLawyers.69 This treatise offers the
following guidance:
"Adverse" effect relates to the quality of the representation, not
necessarily the quality of the result obtained in a given case. The
standard refers to the incentives faced by the lawyer before or
during the representation because it often cannot be foretold what
the actual result would have been if the representation had been
conflict-free.
"Materially" adverse effect. Materiality of a possible conflict is
determined by reference to obligations necessarily assumed by the
lawyer (see § 16), or assumed by agreement with the client either
in the retainer agreement (see § 19) or in the course of the
representation (see § 21). An otherwise immaterial conflict could
62. The State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof'1 Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 2011182 (2011) ("[P]ropounding discovery on an existing client may affect the quality of an attorney's services
to the client seeking the discovery, resulting in a diminution in the vigor of the attorney's discovery
demands or enforcement effort. In addition, it is possible the documents sought could expose the client
from whom discovery is being sought to claims from the client serving the discovery.").
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).

64. Id.
65. See Ferrara v. Jordache Enters. Inc., 819 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
66. See id. at 423; see also Farb v. Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV 05-0596(JS)(ETB), 2011
WL 4465051, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011).
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 24 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
68. Id.
69.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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be considered material if, for example, a client had made clear that
the client considered the possible conflict a serious and substantial
matter.

70

Notably, most conflicts of interest, in most jurisdictions, are imputed to an
attorney's entire firm. The main exception is personal conflicts of interest, which are
unlikely to be at issue here.7 1 Conflicts are generally imputed to and from attorneys
serving merely as "of counsel." 72 In fact, in some jurisdictions a conflict of interest
can be imputed from a co-counsel's firm.7 3 In other words, merely working closely
enough with another law firm can cause an attorney's conflicts to impute to that firm,
and the firm's conflicts to impute to that attorney. 74
Rule 1.8 is also worth noting, which guides lawyers who have a "business
interest" adverse to a client.75 This is analogous, in some marginal way, to the
business interest a lawyer has with an insurer. Rule 1.8 states "[a] lawyer shall
not ... knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client unless" several requirements are met. 7 6 The attorney must
make sure "the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are
fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in
a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client," and the attorney must also
get the client's informed consent.7 7
Let's assume a conflict is found. If a concurrent conflict permits consent, in
other words if the conflict is not unconsentable, the rules set forth requirements for
ensuring the consent is given in an informed manner: all issues on which the clients'
interests might diverge must be fully disclosed in writing and with "adequate
information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available
alternatives" to enable them to make decisions regarding the subject matter of the
representation.

78

Under the model rules, concurrent conflicts can sometimes be cured if the
affected clients consent. 79 However, there is one situation where there can be no cure:
if one client asserts a claim against another client in the "same litigation."
Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict.
However, as indicated in paragraph (b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning
70. Id. § 121.
71. Although an attorney in an insurer-client conflict maybe materially limited by a financial interest
in the opposing insurer, this same interest would likely apply to other attorneys at the firm.
72. See People ex rel. Dep't. of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371 (Cal. 2000)
(noting that like a law firm's partners, associates and members, the "close, fluid, and continuing
relationship [between a law firm and its of counsel lawyers], with its attendant exchanges of information,
advice, and opinions, properly makes the of counsel attorney subject to the conflict imputation rule"); see
also Value Prop. Trust v. Zim Co. (In re Mortg. & Realty Tr.), 195 BR. 740, 754-57, (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1996) (firm disqualified from representing because firm's "of counsel" attorney had served on P's board
of directors).
73. See Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 567 F.2d 225, 233-36 (2d. Cir. 1977).

74. See id.
75. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. See id. r. 1.0.
79. See id. r. 1.7.
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that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide
representation on the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing
more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each
client.
Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests
of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their
informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under
paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer
cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and
diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence). 0
All potentially affected clients must be advised of the consequences of the
potential conflicts and must be kept apprised of future potential conflicts as they
develop."
Some jurisdictions have attempted to temper the effects of direct adversity
conflicts of interest in a limited number of circumstances.8 2 The District of
Columbia's version of Rule 1.7 contains an exception for what are called "thrust
upon" conflicts of interest: situations in which a lawyer or law firm represents two
clients in unrelated matters where there is no adversity, then direct adversity arises
after the representation commences that was not foreseeable at the outset and is not
otherwise waived. In these unique situations, a D.C. lawyer need not withdraw.83
B.

Conflicts of interest in insurancedefense

With a general understanding of conflicts under the Model Rules, we can
now turn to conflicts in the context of insurance defense specifically. Conflicts
stemming from the tripartite relationship, the inherent structure of which requires
insurance defense counsel to serve two masters, the insurer and the insured, are some
of the most written-about ethical problems in American law. 84 Courts and ethics
authorities generally recognize that in the tripartite relationship, the hiring of counsel
85
creates a relationship between the attorney and both the insured and the insurer.

80. Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 14, 15.
81. See id; see also Egedi v. Egedi (In re Marriage of Egedi), 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 522-23 (Ct.
App. 2001) (citing Klemm v. Super. Ct., 142 Cal. Rptr. 509, 514 (Ct. App. 1977)); Spindle v. Chubb/Pac.
Indem. Grp., 152 Cal. Rptr. 776, 780 (Ct. App. 1979) (highlighting the duty to disclose conflicts between
insurer and insured); Klemm, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 514 (warning attorneys of their stringent duty to disclose
conflicts to their potentially affected clients); L.A. Cty. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Responsibility and
Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 471 (1992) (explaining the purposes of the rules requiring disclosure of
conflicts).
82.

See, e.g., Jill B. Berkeley, TripartiteEthics Confidential Communications Among the Insured,

the Insurer, andDefense Counsel, 26 BRIEF 23, 26 (1997).
83.

See RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (D.C. BAR 2006).

84. See, e.g., Berkeley, supra note 82; Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Relationship Between Defense
Counsel, Policyholders, and Insurers: Nevada Rides Yellow

Cab Toward "Two-Client" Model of

TripartiteRelationship. Are Cumis Counsel and MalpracticeClaims by InsurersNext?, NEV. LAW., June

2007, at 20, 22.
85.

See generally John F. Tratnyek, TripartiteRelationship - Insurer, InsuredandDefense Counsel,

N.J. LAW., AUG. 2012, at 71 (presenting the view that an attorney representing both the insured and the
insurer in a tripartite situation is not universal, however, in most jurisdictions and under most authority,
attorneys have some sort of attorney-client relationship with both parties).
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Often the insurer and insured have the same interests in the outcome of litigation and
there is little concern of a conflict.8 6 But in many situations the insured's and
insurer's interests diverge and authorities must decide at what point a conflict of
interest arises, and how it is managed. 8I
Conflicts of interest in a tripartite relationship often arise when "the insurer
issues a reservation of rights to deny coverage partially or fully, when claimed
damages exceed coverage, when the insurer attempts to limit the costs of the defense
to reduce expenses, or when the insurer and insured disagree over whether to settle
or litigate the claims."" In addition to conflicts triggered when the insurer reserves
rights, actual or perceived conflicts can arise for defense counsel in the following
settings: (1) reciprocal claims; (2) multiple defendants conflicts; (3) punitive damage
claims; (4) when the defense continues after the policy limits have been exhausted;
(5) if the insured violates a policy provision, (6) creation of bad law for future cases,
(7) publicity, and (8) delay of a case (where the insurer can wait before paying out
benefits).89
Despite the profound risk of conflict in the tripartite relationship, there is
no clear yardstick for determining when a conflict of interest exists.90 The Model
Rules, and virtually all jurisdictions, allow a third party to pay for a client's legal
fees.91 This is so even though the lawyer's interest in being paid would presumably
align the attorney's interests with the payor-not necessarily the client.9 2 The Model
Rules explain that third party payors are permitted if the client is informed of the
payment and "the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or
independent judgment to the client." 9 3 Notably, even though an attorney in this
situation has clear economic interests in satisfying the interests of the payor, the
Rules do not presume that this poses a conflict of interest, leaving it to the attorney
to determine whether the representation may proceed.9 4 Even if "acceptance of the
payment from any other source presents a significant risk" of a conflict of interestthe rules still do not foreclose representation. 95 The attorney must, without any clear
86. For example, if the insured wins a full dismissal, there is little question the insurer and insured
have the same interests served.
87. For example, where the insured faces large exposure, but the insurer has relatively little on the
line in the form of low policy limits.
88. Tratnyek, supra note 85, at 72; see also Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 545 (Ct.
App. 1984); Purdy v. Pac. Auto. Ins. Co. 203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 534 (Ct. App. 1984); San Diego Navy Fed.
Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (Ct. App. 1984); State Bar of Cal. Standing
Comm. On Prof'1 Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1995-139 (1995) (counsel's discovery of fraud
by insured). See generally, Emp'rs Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1973) (while defending
policyholder Tilley at trial, defense counsel was simultaneously collecting evidence to buttress insurance
company policy defense to coverage for late notice and briefing the legal question for the benefit of
insurance company).
89.

See Sharon K. Hall, Confusion over Conflicts of Interest: Is There a Bright Line for Insurance

Defense Counsel?, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 731, 733-34 (1992).
90. Id.
91. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r 1.8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016); see also Devaney v. United
States, 47 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133 (D. Mass. 1999) aff'd, 229 F.3d 1133 (1st Cir. 2000).
92. See Roszkewycz, supranote 38, at 575.
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 13 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
94. See id.; Roszkewycz, supra note 38, at 575.
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 13 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
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criteria to guide him, judge whether a conflict arises and ensure the attorney's current
client is fully informed of all the risks incumbent in the representation. 96
Despite the potential that the attorney will have a financial bias in favor of
the insurer, and despite the fact that there will often be at least subtle conflicts
between the insured and insurer, courts have not created a per se bar to this tripartite
relationship.97 It is only when a factual conflict arises that most courts disqualify
attorneys in the insurance-defense tripartite relationship (assuming that the
jurisdiction allows such representations in the first place). 98 In other words, the need
for a resolution arises only where the insurer and the insured have an actual conflict
of interest, and where the manner in which the attorney conducts the defense can
affect the outcome of the issue between the insurer and the insured. 99
The decision of the Supreme Court of Alaska in CHIofAlaska v. Employers
Re Insurance Corp is illustrative. There, the court analyzed the manner in which the
interests of the insurance company and policyholder diverge once the possibility
arises that the insurance company may be absolved of its duty to indemnify its
policyholder.100 The court recognized the insurance company's competing interest
(where the insurance company has asserted defenses to coverage) to motivate the
attorney to "offer only a token defense," or to "conduct the defense in such a manner
as to make the likelihood of a plaintiffs verdict greater under the uninsured
theory." 101
Courts treat tripartite conflicts in a variety of ways. Although most
jurisdictions accept that merely because an insurer regularly hires an attorney does
not in itself create a conflict-that is where the agreement ends.1 02 Some courts allow
insureds to hire independent counsel (on the insurer's dime) in certain circumstances.
Different jurisdictions set the threshold for when an actual conflict exists at different
points. 103 Many jurisdictions have consent rules that require defense counsel to
disclose her relationships with the insurer to the client, as well as the possibility that
the interests of the insurer and the insured may conflict, for example, with respect to
a coverage issue. Some jurisdictions have resolved this issue by finding, in the
reservation of rights setting where defense counsel has the potential to influence the
outcome of the coverage issue by the manner in which defense is conducted, that
panel counsel is disqualified from the representation and the insurer is required to
engage separate counsel to defend the insured.1" But, again, when this separate
counsel is needed is unclear from the existing rules in many jurisdictions. (In
California, most notably, the groundbreaking Cumis decision generated so much
dissatisfaction and uncertainty that within a short time, the legislature was required

96. See generally id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., CHI, Inc. v. Emp'rs Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1993).
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. Id. (first quoting then citing Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 289).
102.

See generally Tratnyek, supranote 85, at 72.

103. Id.
104. See, e.g., San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 501-02
(Ct. App. 1984), superceded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West 2017); Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 815 (N.Y. 1981); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West 2017).
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to step in and create a framework for managing the tumult which had ensued.) And
this resolution is expensive and unrealistic in many small cases. Further, even when
separate, non-panel, counsel is hired, the new counsel is still likely to face potentially
conflicting loyalties to the insurer that is now paying her. 05
The potential for conflict in the insurance defense setting goes beyond just
the tripartite relationship. Various insurers, some or all of whom may be clients of
insurance defense counsel in unrelated matters, may also be adverse to each other in
any given case. In today's complex liability environment, people and companies
often purchase distinct insurance policies covering different aspects of their business
or activities. Often these policies may overlap-leading to complex coverage
disputes between different insurers. 1 06 Whether coverage is triggered under different
policies will often depend on the actual or alleged actions of the insured. If the
insured acted one way-one insurer's policy may be triggered. 107 If she acted another
way-perhaps another policy, or policies, may be triggered.108 What is an attorney
to do if she has loyalties to both insurers involved in this case?
Adding another layer of difficulty to the problem, a single lawsuit may
contain, explicitly or subtly, alternative allegations-each of which could if proven
at trial push the insured's liability out of coverage altogether. Defense counsel may,
consciously or unconsciously, affect the outcome of a coverage dispute by the
manner in which he or she responds in pleadings and discovery and in how the case
is presented at trial. Even a task as integral to the defense of the case as proposing
jury instructions or jury questions could have a profound effect on whether the
insured's exposure to liability is covered by one or more of its policies. Such
considerations about how litigation tactics or strategy might impact the availability
of liability insurance coverage may be technically outside the scope of defense
counsel's retention to defend the insured. But will that principle provide a complete
defense to counsel if the insured loses the case and is ultimately bereft of insurance
coverage for the adverse verdict, then sues or brings a bar complaint against defense
counsel? After all, defense counsel may have been making the best argument she
could for the insured-but if that argument means the insurance company no longer
has to cover the insured's bill, is that not another breach of loyalty in itself?
Take this already-complex dance and add in more defendants, more
policies, and more coverage disputes. Litigation triggering a defense obligation
under a liability policy often arises in the context of tort claims. 109 Perhaps the most
common is an auto accident involving multiple vehicles. 110 Quite often there are
105.

See, e.g., Ben L. Kessinger, Jr., EthicalProblems Confronting Insurance Defense Counsel, KY.

BENCH & B., Jan. 1983, at 10 (discussing insurance lawyers' loyalties related to future business from
insurer); O'Malley, supra note 10.
106. See Susan Randall, CoordinatingLiability Insurance, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1339, 1363 (1995)
(discussing coverage overlaps and "other insurance" disputes).
107. Id. at 1362-65; see Samuel M. Taylor, Duke University v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.:
The CourtofAppeals Brings Ambiguity to the Interpretationof "ProfessionalServices ", 69 N.C.L. REV.

1644, 1658 (1991).
108. Randall, supra note 106, at 1362-65.
109. See, e.g., Amy Dunn Taylor, Mass Tort Litigation Management and Ethics, 44 S. TEx. L. REV.
483, 484 (2003) (examining ethical issues in mass torts).
110.

See generally Thomas A. Gordon & Roger Westendorf, Liability Coverage for Toxic Tort,

Hazardous Waste Disposal and Other Pollution Exposures, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 567, 573 (1989).
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multiple defendants, and plaintiffs, in these cases. This means more insurance
companies, and more policies, all battling with each other to point the liability in the
others' direction."' And more potential problems for insurance defense counsel, who
will likely be asked to shift liability onto another party (and by extension, another
insurer). 112
Making all this worse is that insurance litigation sometimes encapsulates
two separate disputes. On one level is the obvious tort dispute. Plaintiff sues
defendant for running a red light and hitting the plaintiffs car, for example. But on
another level, there are often disputes about whether the relevant insurance
companies satisfied their obligations under the insurance policy-which can involve
allegations of unfair claims handling statutes, or common law bad faith claims."
Insurers in virtually all states are charged with special duties towards their
insureds.11 4 If an insurer unreasonably refuses to pay out benefits to an insured, (or
more apt in the liability setting, unreasonably fails to defend a claim against the
insured, fails to settle claims against the insured where the insurer has a reasonable
opportunity to do so, or violates various statutory or regulatory standards in the
handling of a claim) the insurer can be exposed to liability for extra-contractual
damages -- either to the insured directly or to the tort plaintiff after taking an
assignment of rights from the insured." What is the insurance defense attorney to
do: protect the insurer's potential liability for a bad faith claim, or protect the
insured's best interest with respect to these claims (even though the attorney was not
hired or paid to do so)? Even a careful practitioner seeking to stay out of the fray
may find herself having to undertake steps in the defense of the tort claim which will
inevitably help either the insured or the insurer in the subsequent extra-contractual
litigation.
Pre-litigation interaction among attorneys and insurers for potential
defendants is a hazard-fraught environment for insurance defense counsel. In most
jurisdictions, insurance companies are rarely parties to the litigation brought against
their insureds. However, defense attorneys, whether or not they will eventually assert
a cross-claim or third-party claim on behalf of their clients, will often be required to
develop facts and legal arguments and engage with such other actors who are
involved in the underlying dispute. These other actors may eventually be brought
into the litigation, either by the plaintiff or by a defendant, without a defense attorney
knowing the identity of these actors' liability insurers, some of whom may turn out
to be other clients of the attorney or her firm.116 The attorney shooting in the pre111. See Taylor, supra note 106, at 484 (discussing conflicts arising in multi-party litigation
situations); Gordon & Westendorf, supra note 110, at 573.
112. See generally Hawkins Inc.v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., No. A07-1529, 2008 WL
4552683 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2008) (discussing this conflict of shifting liability in the context of codefendant representations, which raise similar issues); Insurer Dodges Most of $4m Settlement in
Mislabeled-DrugCase, ANDREWS BAD FAITH LITIG. REPORTER, Nov. 18, 2008, at 4.

113. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Common-Sense Constructionof Unfair
Claims Settlement Statutes: Restoring the Good Faith in Bad Faith, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1477, 1482 (2009)
(discussing the history and development of the bad faith claim).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116.

1 STEVEN PLITT & JORDAN Ross PLITT, PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR HANDLING INSURANCE CASES

§

4:4, Westlaw (database updated Jul. 2017); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Peerless Indus. Inc., No. 06-4621, 2007
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litigation dark may merely request information, or she may be required to engage a
potential party, whose insurer is unknown at this point, in a frank discussion about
the potential assertion of a claim, and demand indemnity, contribution towards a
settlement, or that the party assume or share the burden of defending a claim. Now
the attorney is taking adverse positions against a party, whose yet-unknown insurer
may well be a firm client, outside of the court process altogether. Does this violate a
rule? The Model Rules certainly do not tell us. And if engaging with a potential
future adverse party in this manner is forbidden, what is counsel to do when it is
usually impossible pre-litigation to determine the identity of the liability insurers
covering potential adversaries?
What if insurance defense counsel has in the course of unrelated
assignments acquired information about an insurance company client's practices
which become relevant during the course of defending an insured? Is defense counsel
disqualified anytime that insurance company foots the bill for a defendant that might,
at some point, become adverse to the insurer? Does defense counsel have a duty to
disclose this "insider information" to his current client and carrier? If he discloses,
has he breached a duty to his former client? If he fails to disclose it in order to protect
the adverse insurer, does he breach an obligation to his current client and insured?
Professional liability policies, which insure doctors, lawyers, and other
professionals, often include consent to settle provisions, whereby the insurer's right
to settle a liability claim is limited to those situations where the insured has provided
written consent. When an opportunity to settle a case emerges, the insurer and the
insured begin a dance which might affect whether the case settles and on what terms,
and might have the effect of shifting the risk of an excess verdict to the insurer. These
scenarios can create significant conflicts of interest between the insurer and the
insured. How far can insurance defense counsel go in counseling the insured
professional on the challenging and sometimes complex issues which surround these
scenarios? Can or must insurance defense counsel give advice to the client on
whether, when, or how to consent? What if insurance defense counsel knows that it
may be in the insured's best interests to demand that the insurer settle the case-is
defense counsel duty bound to give that advice? Or should defense counsel stay out
of the dispute because it is beyond the scope of his or her representation? Does the
answer change if the client is also represented by personal counsel?
Unlike other types of practice areas where an attorney or firm can build a
continuing relationship with a set of clients and have little risk of having to bring
cross claims (for example, in representing employers in discrimination suits),1 1 7
insurance defense attorneys do not have this luxury. Because attorneys constantly
face at least a potential of taking an adverse position against an insurer (and because
the chances of that insurer being a client is high given the small panel-attorney
playing field) a framework for dealing with these specific issues is desperately
needed. 1

WL 2029298 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2007) (addressing cross-claim situation between insurers); Pa. Fed. Court
Finds Jurisdictionover Asbestos InsuranceCase, ANDREWS ASBESTOS LITIG. REPORTER, July 27, 2007,
at 7.
117. WOLFRAM, supra note 6, at 555.
118. Id.
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A CASE STUDY IN INSURANCE DEFENSE ETHICS

To illustrate the extent of ethical uncertainties for insurance defense
counsel, and the cost of and difficulty of resolving these issues without more targeted
guidance, we now offer a case study in a common ethical situation in the conflict of
interest arena. We first explain the ethical situation; we then put ourselves in the
shoes of each of the interested parties (insurer, attorney, and client) to see if the
existing uniform ethical rules offer an answer.
The common situation we use for this case study is as follows. An attorney
is hired by an insurance company to represent one of the company's insureds in a
personal injury case. Although the insured is the primary (or, depending on the
jurisdiction, sole) client, defense counsel's relationship with the insurer goes back
many years, and dozens of cases. Our attorney files a series of discovery requests
and realizes, good news, it looks like another driver may have contributed to the
accident. This revelation has the potential to shift some of the liability onto the
shoulders of the new party and his insurer. Only after joining the new party to the
lawsuit and serving basic discovery on him does defense counsel learn that this other
insurer is the counsel's second-best client, Insurance Company B. The question is:
Do we have a conflict of interest here?
Our attorney would first turn to the ethical rules on conflicts of interest. As
explained above, authorities on conflicts of interest generally tell us a few things.
Current conflicts exist when an attorney's current clients are "directly adverse" to
each other.11 9 We know that "directly adverse" means, at least, when two clients are
named parties opposed in the same litigation-in other words, two clients have
official claims against each other. 120 Outside of that, authorities provide little specific
guidance on what other situations might create "direct adversity." 121 But we know
122
that the circumstances must be examined in their totality.
In addition, we know that, aside from direct adversity, a current conflict
exists when an attorney will be materially limited in her representation of a client. 1 2 3
Material limitations can come from any personal or professional interest that
prejudices the attorney's ability to represent clients.1 2 4 Again, material limitations
are a fact intensive question that will vary under the circumstances.
Finally, we know that some concurrent conflicts can be cured. 1 25 Whether
a concurrent conflict can be cured depends on whether the conflict is client vs. client
in the same litigation (which means that it cannot be cured) or whether the attorney
cannot provide adequate representation to a client because of the conflict (another

119. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).

120. Id.
121. Hawkins Inc. v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., No. A07-1529, 2008 WL 4552683 (Minn.
Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2008) (discussing this conflict of shifting liability in the context of co-defendant
representations, which raise similar issues); Insurer Dodges Most of $4m Settlement in Mislabeled-Drug
Case, ANDREWS BAD FAITH LITIG. REPORTER Nov. 18, 2008, at 4.

122.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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fact intensive inquiry).1 2 6 Whatever the case, curing a conflict always requires
127
informed consent of all affected clients.
The Model Rules don't give us a clear answer yet, just some general
principles. We now turn to the relevant caselaw and ethics opinions in this area for
more guidance.
1.

Whether counsel has breached an ethical obligation to the adverse
insurer

Turning back to our factual scenario, we first consider whether the attorney
has breached ethical obligations towards the insurer for the party that counsel is
targeting with a potential third-party complaint where it turns out that insurer is a
client of defense counsel or her firm.
As explained above, the adversity requirement does not require formal
adversity, such as litigation between two clients. 12 8 Instead, the attorney merely
needs to be "adverse" to her client for a conflict to exist. What constitutes "adverse"
is unclear. 1 29 If an attorney merely prepares an opinion letter for an adverse insurer
(but never appears in court), is that enough? What if an attorney sends a demand
letter to her current client? What if an attorney litigates a dispute in a manner that
will ensure the opposing party's insurer will have to provide coverage?
The insurer for the third-party defendant will have two potential ethical
grounds to challenge defense counsel in our hypothetical. First, the insurer could
allege that the duty of loyalty the attorney owes to the insurer creates a direct conflict
where the attorney somehow acts "adverse" to the insurer outside of the named-party
context. 130 Second, the insurer could challenge the attorney on the grounds that the
attorney will be materially limited in representing the insured, most likely because
of the possession of the insurer's relevant confidential information or because of
31
financial bias towards the insurer (who sends the attorney work). 1
As explained by the California Court of Appeal, "[t]he proscription [against
adverse representation] exists whe[never] counsel's employment is 'adverse to the
client or former client,' and can exist even though a prior client is not a party to the
litigation." 1 3 2 Concurrent conflicts of interest may arise in a variety of circumstances
where an attorney assumes a role other than as an attorney who has filed suit against
an existing client.1 33 One court states that the duty of loyalty "seek[s] to avoid

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 685, 701 (Ct. App.
2002); L.A. Cty. Bar Ass'n Prof'1 Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 513 (2005) (discussing
cross examination of former client as expert witness).
129.

See supra Part III.

130.

See supra Part III; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).

131. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016). Of course, it is really
the insured which counsel represents in the litigation, and not the insurer for the third-party defendant,
who should be concerned that counsel might not aggressively pursue the third-party claim against the
driver insured by a firm client. Nevertheless, the insurer for the third-party defendant may well raise the
material limitation grounds as part of its effort to disqualify defense counsel.
132. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Tracinda Corp., 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 327, 334 (Ct. App. 1995).
133. Manfredi & Levine v. Super. Ct., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 497-98 (Ct. App. 1998).
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allowing an attorney to take a role that places him in actual or potential conflict with
a client." 13 4 But an attorney can be "potentially" in conflict with one of her clients
by taking almost any insurance defense case. 3 5 As the court explained in State Farm
vs. Federal, this duty of loyalty includes the "attorney's duty to protect the client in
every possible way." 13 6 Consequently, "[i]t is a violation of the duty of loyalty for
the attorney to assume a position adverse of or antagonistic to his or her client
without the client's free and intelligent consent given after full knowledge of all the
facts and circumstances." 13 7
The Restatement Third of The Law Governing Lawyers provides an
extremely broad concept of "adverse" conflicts in the insurance context.1 3 8 The
Restatement suggests that an attorney may be in a conflict if she provides "advice
and other legal services to the insured concerning . . claims against other persons
insured by the same insurer, and the advisability of asserting other claims against the
insurer." 13 9 The Restatement goes on to state that in such a situation, at the least "the
lawyer must inform the insured in an adequate and timely manner of the limitation
on the scope of the lawyer's services and the importance of obtaining assistance of
other counsel with respect to such matters." 140 This language suggests that an
attorney is prohibited from even providing advice or any other "legal service"
concerning any possible claim against persons insured by the insurer-client. 1 4 1 The
Restatement does not suggest that informed consent be obtained-but instead, that
this is a "limitation" that must be communicated to the client. 142 In other words, the
attorney cannot even advise about bringing claims against an insurer-client (much
14 3
less prepare such a claim).
Instructive authority is found in a California Court of Appeal case and the
ensuing modification to California's ethical rules. 144 In State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. FederalInsurance Co., the California Court of Appeal
held that an attorney was prohibited from filing a case against an insurer where the
insurer is a current client of the attorney. 145 Following the decision in State Farm,
the California State Legislature asked the State Bar to conduct a study to determine
when and whether an attorney may litigate against an insurer-client. 1 46 After the

134. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 685, 702 (Ct. App.
2002).
135.

See, e.g., id.

136. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 26 (Ct. App. 1999).
137. Id.
138.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. a-g. (AM. LAW INST.

2000).
139. Id. § 134 cmt. f.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144.

See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20 (Ct. App. 1999).

145. Id. at 29.
146. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068.11 (Deering 2002) (repealed 2003); see CAL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 3-3 10 (STATE BAR OF CAL. 1992); see also Phillip Feldman, Time for Change: California
Needs Some of the ABA Ethics Rules, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Aug. 2001, at 16, 16 (noting that State
Farm "seemed to prompt Business & Professions Code §6069.11 [sic]").
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study's comission, the discussion section of California's direct conflict rule, Rule 3310, was amended. 147 That discussion section now provides that "[n]otwithstanding
State Farm, [subparagraph (C)(3) of this provision] . . is not intended to apply with
respect to the relationship between an insurer and a member when, in each matter,
the insurer's interest is only as an indemnity provider and not as a direct party to the
action."1 48 Critically, California's ethical rules appear to draw the ethical line at the
point in which an insurer is a direct party in the action. In other words, this language
suggests that, at least in California, an attorney may litigate against an insured
indemnified by an insurer-client without creating a disqualifying conflict. 149 On the
other hand, the language still does not address the situation where an attorney may
be pursuing, preparing, or advising her client about a lawsuit against the insurerclient (without actually filing a formal lawsuit against the insurer) or perhaps even
negotiating adverse to the insurer-client.5 0 Although one could presume that the
safe-harbor created by the amendment to California's ethical rules protects defense
counsel, both pre-litigation and after filing suit as long as the firm-client insurer is
not itself eventually named as a party, the rule and the comments remain silent on
whether pre-litigation advice and conduct which might otherwise be considered
materially adverse to the insurer are permissible.
Moreover, California's safe harbor is not the rule in many other
jurisdictions. Comments to many states' ethical rules, and cases interpreting various
rules, suggest that an attorney may not represent one client against another of the
attorney's clients in negotiations." This indicates that an attorney might be
prevented from carrying out actions adverse to an insurer-client, such as writing a
demand letter, even where the insurer is not a party to the litigation. 152 For example,
Idaho's version of Model Rule 1.7(a)(1) prohibits a lawyer from simultaneously
representing current clients if "the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client" and "a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of
clients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or
contemplated."15 3 This would indicate that an attorney should be prohibited from
adversely negotiating against one of her client insurers.
Curtis v. Radio Representatives, Inc. is illustrative.1 5 4 The case presented
an interesting procedural stance: A law firm represented the defendant client in
renewing its broadcast license with the Federal Communications Commission

147.

See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3-3 10 (STATE BAR OF CAL. 1992).

148. Id.; see also Bus. & PROF.
149. BUS. & PROF.

§ 6068.11

§ 6068.11.

(not addressing these issues).

150. See id. Although the Rules of Professional Conduct are not binding on civil courts in determining
disqualification motions, they are commonly relied upon for guidance. No published opinion, however,
has considered this revised discussion to Rule 3-310.
151. See, e.g., In re CMH Homes, Inc., No. 04-13-00050-CV, 2013 WL 2446724, at *7 (Tex. Ct.
App. June 5, 2013); Wyshak, No. 92-0-20339, 1999 WL 778086, at *1 (Review Dep't of the State Bar
Court of Cal. Sept. 21, 1999); see also Eiger & Rutan supra note 57, at 949.
152.

See, e.g., Eiger & Rutan supra note 57, at 949.

153. IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (IDAHO STATE BAR 1986); id. r 1.7 cmt. 29; see
also Storfer v. Dwelle, No. 3:12-CV-00496-EJL, 2014 WL 3965033, at *8 (D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2014)
(citing IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cmt. 29 (IDAHO STATE BAR 1986).
154. See generally Curtis v. Radio Representatives, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1988).
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("FCC")."'The law firm then sued the client for unpaid fees.15 6 In defending against
the suit for unpaid fees, the client claimed it should not have to pay because the law
1 7
firm had violated its ethical obligations regarding concurrent conflicts.
The client's theory was that the firm had concurrently represented
competing radio and television station owners in obtaining or renewing broadcast
licenses from the FCC." The client argued it should be relieved of its obligation to
pay its legal fees based on the contention that the attorney had conflicting interests
in representing multiple parties for a small number of fixed licenses.15 9 The
attorney's representation would, practically, have negative effects on its other clients
who were also seeking the licenses.1 60 The Curtis court held that this was not an
"adverse representation" within the meaning of the rules because there was
insufficient indication that representation of one client would create directly adverse
consequences for other clients. 161 After all, it was not clear that by procuring a
license for one client another client would not be able to get a license.1 6 2 Notably,
however, the court did suggest that there may be a concurrent conflict if the same
attorney represented one client against the interests of the others with respect to
"objectionable electrical interference [that] existed between two stations." 16 3 In other
words, if there was more direct evidence that the representation of one client,
practically, would have directly harmful implications on another of the attorney's
clients, there may be a concurrent conflict.1 6
Another federal court held that clients would be "adverse" within the
meaning of the rules if an attorney represented two competing shopping centers, both
competing to acquire a certain tenant, and helped one shopping center negotiate a
lease with the desired tenant. 1 65 In other words, because a favorable outcome for one
client would mean that the attorney's other client would be directly im-pacted in a
negative manner (it could no longer procure the tenant), there was a conflict of
interest potentially.1 66
Potentially illustrative, the Seventh Circuit in Analytica, Inc. v. NPD
Research, Inc. addressed a law firm which was hired to represent one client before
the FCC to encourage the agency to pursue an investigation against another of the
attorney's clients.1 67 While this appears to be an obvious conflict, it is important to
consider that the reason this is a conflict is because the attorney is pursuing a course
of action that could have adverse consequences against one of the attorney's

155. Id. at 731.
156. Id. at 730.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 731-32.
159. Id. at 730-31.
160. Id. at 736-37.
161. Id. at 736.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164.

Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

(AM. LAW. INST. 2000).
165. Bieter Co. v. Blomquist, 132 F.R.D. 220, 221-24 (D. Minn. 1990).
166.

See id.

167. Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
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clients-but that client is not a party to any litigation.168 In Reis v. Barley, Snyder,
Senft & Cohen L.L. C., the issue was that a firm, while representing one corporate
client, secretly helped another client to set up a corporation that was intended by that
client to compete directly with the firm's first client.1 69 The court refused to dismiss
the first client's claim on these facts. 170
171
A District of Columbia decision, Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea,
is similar. A
lawyer represented an aircraft maintenance company while also incorporating and
representing another company that was directly competing with the first client. 1 7 2
The court granted summary judgment that the lawyer breached his fiduciary duty,
calling this breach "patent." 17 3 Also illustrative are cases where a firm provides a
patent opinion letter to one client explaining ways to copy another client's art without
174
infringing any patents-which the same firm is also handling in another matter.
17
A Louisiana decision provides another perspective on this issue." In
Suard, the court applied Louisiana's concurrent conflict rule and found a conflict of
interest where a law firm filed a motion to compel discovery responses and seek
sanctions against an insurer in one proceeding-when in a second proceeding, that
1 76
insurer had retained the same law firm to represent one of its insured.
A Michigan Bar Association opinion letter appears to find a conflict of
interest in the insured-client situation. 177 In that opinion, the state bar committee held
that a clear conflict exists where a law firm represents a plaintiff who sues a
defendant insured by an insurer if that insurer regularly sends business to the law
firm. 17' Even if the law firm only receives a small number of cases from the insurer,
client consent should be obtained. 1 79
In a 2008 decision, the Georgia Supreme Court held that an attorney
representing an insured could not in an unrelated matter also concurrently represent
an insurance company which claimed subrogation rights against the lawyer's
client.18 0 The court explained that this rule does not apply if the insurer in the other

168. Id. at 1270.
169. Reis v. Barley, Snyder, Senft & Cohen L.L.C., 484 F. Supp. 2d 337, 345 (E.D. Pa. 2007) aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Reis v. Barley, Snyder, Senft & Cohen L.L.C., 426 F. App'x 79 (3d Cir.

2011).
170. Id. at 343.
171. Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666 (D.D.C. 1989), vacated sub nom. Avianca, Inc. v.
Harrison ex rel. Estate of Corriea, No. 94-7053, 1995 WL 605521 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1995), andaff'dsub
nom. Avianca, Inc. v. Harrison ex rel. Estate of Corriea, No. 94-7053, 1995 WL 650232 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
24, 1995).
172. Id. at 680.
173. Id.
174.

See, e.g., Andrew Corp. v. Beverly Mfg. Co., 415 F. Supp. 2d 919, 924 (N.D. Ill. 2006).

175. See In re Suard Barge Servs., Inc., No. 96-3185, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12364 (E.D. La. Aug
14, 1997).
176. Id. at *13.
177.

See State Bar of Mich., Formal Op. C-234 (1984).

178.

See id.

179.

See id.

180.
2018).

See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE

§ 30:86,
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matter is another insured (not the insurer).' "Then, consent could be sought
regarding the lawyer's personal interest in the business relationship with the
insurer. "182

Another relevant case is a New Jersey Superior Court decision, Gray v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co.'8 A lawyer represented an insured in litigation. 184 Later,
the attorney represented a different client in a different case in which the client was
directly adverse to the insurer.' The court disqualified the attorney to prevent him
from bringing the claim against the insurer.186 The court had no problem finding that
the attorney had a client-relationship with the insurer given the attorney's prior
representation of its insured. 8 7 The court then held that "it is evident that neither [the
attorney] nor any members of the firm in which he is a member can properly
represent [the insured] in this action against [the insurer]."' The court relied on its
assumption that the attorney would have confidential information and special
knowledge that would prejudice the insurer if the attorney were permitted to sue it:
It may not be seriously disputed that as a result of his 20 years as one of
Commercial Union's lawyers, [the attorney] has obtained confidential information
and possesses knowledge of certain internal policies of Commercial Union that he
will be able to use against it in the Gray litigation.

. .

. Although this general

information may not be specifically relevant to the merits of the Gray-Commercial
Union dispute, it constitutes secrets or confidences . . that could be used against it
to its substantial disadvantage.1 89
Interestingly, courts that prohibit firms from being adverse to an insurance
company which has retained the attorney to represent insureds often focus on the
confidential information the attorney received while working for the insurer.1 90 it
seems speculative to suggest that panel attorneys would have access to enough
confidential information from the insurer merely as a result of acting as insurance
defense counsel in other cases. It appears unlikely that an insurer would have a

181. But this distinction probably holds little value given that most jurisdictions would find a client
relationship by the mere act of representing an insured.
182. MALLEN, supra note 180.
183. 468 A.2d 721, 724-26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983).
184.

See id. at 724-26.

185.

See id. at 723.

186.

See id.

187.

See id. at 724.

188. Id.
189. Id. at 725-26.
190. See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excess Ins. Co., C.A. No. 94-0614B, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19882, at *16 (D.R.I. June 1, 1995) (assessing the situation in which a law firm had represented many
insurance companies and insureds on unrelated matters and disqualifying the law firm from representing
plaintiffs in actions against the insurance companies because the law firm had represented the company
in several matters). In Allendale, the court noted,
Prudential's insureds were being represented by K&T at the time this instant complaint was filed. While
K&T states it represented only the insureds and not Prudential directly, it has been held that where there
is no dispute between an insurer and insured, "as a fundamental proposition a defense lawyer is counsel
to both the insurer and the insured. He owes to each a duty to preserve the confidences and secrets imparted
to him during the course of representation."
Id. (quoting Gray, 468 A.2d at 725)).
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legitimate concern that confidential information would be used to its detriment where
defense counsel is suing one of its insureds in a matter unrelated to any that prior
counsel has done on behalf of other insureds. Such concerns would appear to have
greater legitimacy where defense counsel has represented the insurer directly in
coverage or bad faith actions (during which counsel may have learned much more
sensitive information) and where defense counsel in the instant action is pursuing
claims directly against the insurer, and not merely pursuing claims against a party
insured by the insurer-client.
In conclusion, it is unclear whether an insurer can disqualify one of its panel
attorneys from litigating against one of the insurer's insureds.1 91 It is probable that,
at some point, an attorney can be so "adverse" against the insurer-client, or materially
limited by duties of confidentiality or financial interest, so that a conflict exists. But
that line is difficult, if not impossible, to draw given the existing authority (most of
which is not directly on point). Whether this conflict would be curable is another
open question. About all we can say for sure is that in most jurisdictions, an attorney
is not disqualified from representing a party in litigation merely because the interests
of that client are directly adverse to another party which is insured by a current firm
client, even if that representation is potentially adverse to the insurer-client's
financial interests. But at what point a concrete conflict arises is unclear. More
persuasive may be the argument that the attorney will be biased in favor of the insurer
against the insured-client.
2.

Whether counsel has breached an ethical obligation to her current client
and her current client's insurer

Whether there is a conflict is similarly uncertain from the current-client's
perspective. 19 2 In some ways, the attorney's new client has the most to lose if the
attorney's interests are compromised. 193 It should be noted that, generally, clients can
fire their attorneys at any time. 194 The question, however, is whether a conflict
exists.1 95

As one of us explained in a prior article:

191. Phillip Feldman, Time for Change: CaliforniaNeeds Some of the ABA Ethics Rules, ORANGE
COUNTY LAW., Aug. 2001, at 16, 16 (noting that "from the time an insured completes an application for
insurance until the time the case is resolved, there are many cross roads where going one way benefits the
insured, at the expense of the insurance company and vice versa" and that rules put these lawyers in an
unfair position).
192. This is particularly true given that, when a client has a right to select new paid-for counsel is
unclear as a general matter. See supra Part III.
193. After all, the current client has to worry about whether the attorney might change her
representation style based on allegiance to the opposing insureds insurer.
194. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016); id. r. 1.16 cmt. 4
("A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause ....
); WOLFRAM, supra
note 6, at 318.
195. This question also can be relevant to whether a client has a right to have her insurer pay for
replacement counsel. Also, it is technically true that presiding judges may prohibit discharge of counsel
where it would be unduly disruptive. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12,
15 (2d Cir. 1965).
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[A] concurrent conflict of interest may occur where the lawyer is
materially limited by her interests to some third party. Ethical rules
and court opinions carefully scrutinize such a possibility whenever
a third party pays an attorney's bills. The rules and authorities also
look closely anytime a lawyer has some sort of financial or
personal interest in an opposing party. These concerns are,
arguably, important in the context of opposing-insurer-client
situations. "House counsel" or "panel counsel" models inherent in
modem insurance practice involve a long-term conditional
employment or contractual relationship for the services of the
lawyer on behalf of the insurer. "It is understood that so long as
the payments result in a benefit to the enterprise, the lawyer will
continue to represent its members. Otherwise, the retention of the
lawyer will come to an end." And interest in pleasing other parties
does not always have to be merely financial. For example, under
California law, merely "propounding discovery on an existing
client may affect the quality of an attorney's services to the client
seeking the discovery, resulting in a diminution in the vigor of the
1 96
attorney's discovery demands or enforcement effort."
There is an important feature of our scenario that may buffer the contention
that defense counsel may be materially limited due to her relationship with the thirdparty defendant's insurer from vigorously pursuing relief on behalf of the insured
against the third-party defendant. In the most common tripartite scenario, the
attorney has a long-term client or fiscal relationship with the insurer, and a one-time
relationship with the insured. 197 In contrast, here, the attorney has a long-term
relationship with insurers on both ends: the insurer defending and potentially
indemnifying the current insured-client, and the insurer covering the third-party
defendant.198
But some authority indicates that there may be a material limitation inherent
in an attorney representing an insured where an insurer-client stands to lose. The
second circuit has probably given this question the most thought in the oftenanalyzed United States v. Schwarz.199
In Schwarz, a firm represented a police officer accused of assaulting
someone.2 00 The firm's fees were paid by the Patrolman's Benevolent Association,
a labor union that represented police officers.2 0 1 The PBA had a long-term contract
with this particular firm, which included representation of it in other matters.2 02 The
police officer client wanted to pursue a strategy of casting blame on the conduct of

196. Joseph Regalia, Bringing Ethical Challenges Against Insurance Defense Counsel as a
GovernmentLawyer, (Gov't L. Committee Newsl., Chicago, Ill), Spring 2016, at 1, 10 (quoting first Aviva
Abramovsky, The EnterpriseModel ofManaging Conflicts ofInterest in the TripartiteInsurance Defense

Relationship, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 193, 196 (2005) then quoting State Bar of California Standing Comm.
on Prof'1 Responsibility & Conduct Formal Op. 2011-182 (2011)).
197. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3-310(C)(3) (STATE BAR OF CAL. 1992).
198.

See supra Part II.

199. 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002).
200. See id.
201. Id. at 81.

202. Id.
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another officer, also covered under the PBA umbrella, but defense counsel declined
to adopt this strategy. The case did not go well, and the officer defendant blamed his
lawyer's failure to pursue the requested blame-shifting strategy for the adverse result.
On appeal, Schwarz argued that the firm's financial interest in maintaining
its contract with the PBA created a conflict of interest. 203 He argued that this was a
per se conflict that violated his attorney's duty of undivided loyalty. 204 He
specifically raised the firm's 10 million dollar contract with the PBA, which was
conditioned on the PBA's "satisfaction" with the firm's performance generally. 205
The court found an actual conflict of interest, explaining that that lawyer "had a
strong personal interest in refraining from any conduct to which the PBA might
object." 2 06 The Court held that the firm had a strong interest in not shifting blame to
another co-defendant officer. 2 07 The mere fact that a plausible strategy would have
pitted the firm's current client against another officer the PBA had an interest in
protecting, created a conflict according to this court. 2 08
Schwarz is a court's recognition that long-term future fee considerations
may constitute a conflict of interest. 209 Schwarz also stands for the proposition that,
under certain circumstances, such a conflict may "so permeate[] the defense that no
meaningful waiver [can] be obtained." 2 1 0 The court stated:
[T]he conflict between [the firm's] representation of Schwarz, on the one
hand, and his ethical obligation to the PBA as his client and his self-interest in the
PBA retainer, on the other, was so severe that no rational defendant in Schwarz's
position would have knowingly and intelligently desired [the firm's]
representation . . we hold that Schwarz's counsel suffered an actual conflict, that
the conflict adversely affected his representation, and that the conflict was
unwaivable. 2 1 1
This reasoning directly applies to the insurance defense relationship. In
Schwartz, the firm receiving future work hinged on "satisfaction with the [] firm's
performance." Insurers also explicitly or implicitly condition counsel's continuing
on panel and receipt of future assignments on "satisfaction" with an attorney's
performance. 212 It could be argued that client satisfaction is always a factor when a
client is considering whether to rehire an attorney, but here the key is that this
satisfaction is measured by a third party to the litigation, not the attorney's
performance with the current client. 2 13
Courts also search for evidence that insurance defense counsel will carry
out the case in a way in which the opposing party wins, but the resulting judgment
falls outside the insurer's coverage. In a traditional tripartite relationship-as

203. Id. at 82.

204. Id. at 94.
205. Id. at 91.
206. Id.

207. Id. at 99.
208. See id. at 94-95.
209. See id.

210. Id. at 96.
211. Id. at 96-97.
212. See supra Part 1.2.
213. See United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 94 (2d Cir. 2002).
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explained above-one of the concerns is that an unscrupulous attorney will
jeopardize the insured's case to build a record that will (later) get the insurer off the
hook for indemnification. In practice, this risk may be minimal, both because most
defense practitioners take their obligations to the insured-client seriously and steer
clear of coverage issues, and also because the attorney may not have examined
carefully the grounds for a reservation of rights and how particular defense tactics
and strategies might affect coverage under the policy. Nevertheless, the risk for such
objectionable intermeddling by defense counsel in coverage issues is built into the
structure of the tri-partite relationship and the dynamic intersection of liability and
coverage issues and must be guarded against.
At bottom, we are left with many questions and few answers. Does having
some financial interest in an adverse insurer mean that an attorney is being unethical
towards her current insured-client? At what point are those interests severe enough
to create a conflict? We simply do not know.
3.

Whether counsel has breached ethical obligations to any other parties

The third-party defendant may also have an interest in disqualifying the
allegedly conflicted attorney. After all, the attorney's relationship with the thirdparty defendant's insurer may give the attorney a leg up in prosecuting the thirdparty complaint. The attorney is likely to know the insurer's general methods for
handling cases, such as their settlement policies or budgets. This could theoretically
disadvantage the adverse insured, not just the adverse insurer.
Although generally one must have an attorney-client relationship to
challenge a conflict of interest, some courts have allowed third parties to the
attorney-client relationship to enforce a conflict violation. The Supreme Court of
Delaware, for example, has held that a non-client has standing to enforce a violation
of the conflict of interest rule if it can "prove by clear and convincing evidence (1)
the existence of a conflict and (2) demonstrate how the conflict will prejudice the
fairness of the proceedings." 2 14 We do not consider the issue at length because it is
outside the scope of this article, but it is possible that the other insured would have
standing depending on how egregious a conflict was.
4.

Conclusion: we just don't know

It is unclear at what point an attorney may have a conflict. Under some
authority, such as the Restatement, the lawyer may be conflicted anytime she brings
a lawsuit against an insured indemnified by a current-client insurer. If this is the case,
the second question becomes whether the conflict is consentable. 2 15 Most authorities,
including the Model Rules, state that representation involving "the assertion of a
claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal" is unconsentable. 2 16 There is some
indication that an insurer indemnifying a party is not "in the litigation." But this is

214. Melissa Moreau, Nonclients Enforcing Conflict of Interest Violations, 17 J. LEGAL PROF. 305,
306 (1992).
215. See supra Part I.2.A.
216. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
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far from certain. Some cases have found conflicts to be unconsentable even where a
third party is not a named party in the case-leaving the consent question unclear.
Even if consent were potentially allowed, consent only cures if all relevant
parties agree. It is unclear who must agree: the opposing insurer, the current insurer,
the current client, and the opposing insured? If so, there is a substantial possibility at
least one of these parties will not consent.
Other authority suggests that the lawyer has some leeway when determining
whether a conflict exists in the opposing-insurer situation. In these jurisdictions,
lawyers must use their own judgment and discretion to determine whether they will
be "materially limited" in their interests or loyalties to the opposing insurer.
At bottom, confidently navigating this situation in a way that keeps defense
counsel clearly within the lines is almost impossible. There are no clear answers in
virtually any jurisdiction. The Model Rules provide merely general standards with
no sense of when a conflict might arise. And given how common this issue is, all of
the above parties are left at sea in a number of cases-and told to simply proceed at
their own risk.
III.
THE COSTS OF UNCERTAINTY: THE RISING COSTS OF
INSURANCE, THE RISING COSTS OF LITIGATING ETHICS DISPUTES,
AND THE VARIOUS INTERESTS OF ALL INVOLVED IN INSURANCE
DEFENSE
To craft a better solution than the vague standards out there now, it will help
to have an idea about what policy interests are at play. Several players have interests
at stake here-the insurers; the attorneys; the clients themselves; and yes, even the
public, which stands to lose money in the form of rising insurance premiums. By
leaving everyone in the dark about these ethical pitfalls, everyone loses.
The first policy interest in play is confidentiality. Representing adverse
interests in unrelated matters may compromise confidential information that
attorneys have a continuing duty to protect. 2 17 This duty of confidentiality is
generally broad and could easily encapsulate the types of information panel counsel
would learn about an insurer. 2 18 For example, panel attorneys may have access to
confidential information about how a specific insurer works-their business
practices and management processes-which provide a strategic advantage. 2 1 9
Insurers often use "litigation guidelines" which contain information about how the
insurer prefers to handle cases, its strategies, and other information which an attorney
(on the other side) could use to the insurer's advantage. 2 20 These guidelines can

217.

See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.05 (STATE BAR OF TEX. 1989)

(requiring information to be kept confidential even if it is not privileged).
218. For example, Texas's rules, which are standard, creates confidentiality duties covering "all
information relating to a client or furnished by the client . . . acquired by the lawyer during the course of
or by reason of the representation of the client." Id.
219. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 11, 30-31 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016); Gregory
Zimmer, Suing a CurrentClient: Responsibility andRespectabilityin the Conduct ofthe Legal Profession,

11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 371 (1998).
220. See Michael D. Morrison & James R. Old, Jr., Economics, Exigencies andEthics:Whose Choice?
Emerging Trends and Issues in Texas Insurance Defense Practice, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 349, 382-83

(2001).
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contain information about experts the insurer uses, for example; what types of legal
research can be conducted; rules about when and how depositions are to be taken;
which types of motions to file; and more. 2 2 1 Insurers are likely to be concerned that,
armed with this general information about how an insurer runs its insured's cases,
the opposing attorney could have an advantage.
Next, the public image of the bar, or in other words the appearance of
impropriety, is an issue. Representing an insurer in some cases, and then taking
positions adverse to that insurer in other cases, suggests that lawyers will do anything
for the money, casting a negative light on the profession. 2 2 2 And without clear ethical
guidelines, neither the attorneys nor the public know what is unethical.
The trial process demands direct confrontation, particularly during public
cross-examination of witnesses. Cross-examining a current client is distasteful and
awkward. The current lawyer-client relationship between the witness and the
examiner may either give the examiner an unfair advantage in exposing bias or
equivocation or give the examiner an incentive to "go easy" and compromise his
duties to the other client. 223
Zeal of advocacy is perhaps the most important policy interest here. The
risk is that a lawyer may not fight as hard where his current insurer-client has an
interest in the opposing party winning.224 At the least, a worry is that the lawyer will
not pursue claims with as much zeal as she otherwise would. As explained in detail
by one commentator, many scholars and courts have recognized an inherent financial
interest, and potential conflict, when an attorney is asked to take a position adverse
to an insurer-client:
The influence of the relational nature of defense counsel's longterm pecuniary interests, like the potential for conflict identified
above, pose an "inherent danger." In order to further analyze the
magnitude of this risk, it is important to focus upon the business
realities of defense counsel lawyers and the type of firm structures
225
where such counsel are generally found.
In an often-cited dissent in State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co. v.
Traver, Justice Gonzalez of the Texas Supreme Court explained that this has led to
a proliferation of "captive law firms." 2 26 Ethics scholars such as Professor Stephen
L. Pepper explain the concern:
The [insurance] companies control the livelihood of the lawyer; if they
decide to stop purchasing a particular lawyer's or firm's services it may well mean
economic disaster. (The lawyer will have to retool in mid-career; essentially learn a

221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. of the Bar v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (Conn. 1964); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Informal Op. 1495 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1982).
223. Zimmer, supra note 219, at 374-75 (discussing effects on "trial strategy" when representing
adverse parties).
224. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978).
225. Aviva Abramovsky, The EnterpriseModel of Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Tripartite
Insurance Defense Relationship, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 193, 219 (2005).
226. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 633 (Tex. 1998) (Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting in part).
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new kind of lawyering and compete for an economically viable position within the
profession.) The lawyers are thus small economic fish dependent upon the much
larger insurance companies. If the companies prefer that the interests of a few
insureds be risked or sacrificed here and there in favor of the larger interests of all
insureds (that is, the well being-profit-of the insurance company), then what's a
well-meaning lawyer to do?22 7
At least one court has recognized that "[e]ven the most optimistic view of
human nature requires us to realize that an attorney employed by an insurance
company will slant his efforts, perhaps unconsciously, in the interest of his real
client-the one who is paying his fee and from whom he hopes to receive future

business.

. . . "228

A client also expects personal loyalty from his attorney. An insurer which
has sent its panel counsel many cases over the years may feel betrayed when that
same lawyer turns up representing a party adverse to the insurer's insured. 2 2 9 Under
current rules, attorneys contemplating a claim against a party insured by a client face
a minefield on one side (bring the claim at your own professional peril because the
rules and case law do not tell you if it is safe), and on the other (withdraw or refrain
from bringing the third-party claim thereby potentially compromising your insuredclient's position or causing the client or his insurer to hire new counsel). Wellintended insurance defense counsel should not be placed into ethical harm's way by
this absence of clear guidance.
As things now stand, the concurrent conflict rules can be said to allow large
institutions, like insurers, to disqualify large swathes of lawyers from taking any
adverse action against them. 2 30 Considering how small some markets are, this could
be a significant burden. 2 3 1 The uncertainty of these rules may discourage careful
attorneys from even entering dangerous waters, which ultimately harms insureds
who might benefit from the services of such professionals. Allowing conflicts of
interest to exist merely because an attorney's current-client insurer may dislike it

227. Stephen L. Pepper, Applying the Fundamentals of Lawyers' Ethics to Insurance Defense
Practice, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 46 (1997).
228. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 938 n. 5 (8th Cir. 1978); see
also Richmond, supra note 20, at 481 ("To protect its insureds' interests when suit is filed, insurers
typically hire defense counsel from among a panel of firms with which each carrier regularly deals.");
Abramovsky, supra note 225, at 195-96; Richmond, supra note 21, at 271.
229. See, e.g., Jeffry v. Pounds, 136 Cal. Rptr. 373, 376-77 (Ct. App. 1977); ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof'1 Responsibility, Informal Op. 1495 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1982).

"

230. Manning v. Waring, 849 F.2d 222, 224-25 ("Unquestionably, the ability to deny one's opponent
the services of capable counsel, is a potent weapon."); see also Mark F. Anderson, Motions to Disqualify
Opposing Counsel, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 238, 239 (1991) (noting increased frequency of tactical
disqualification motions); John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith
Participationin Court-ConnectedMediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 122 (2002) ("In recent
decades, lawyers have used any available litigation procedure to pressure the other side into a favorable
settlement. These 'Rambo tactics' include motions to disqualify attorneys for conflicts of interest .....
(footnote omitted)). But see, Ronald D. Rotunda, Resolving Client Conflicts by Hiring "Conflicts
Counsel," 62 HASTING L.J. 677, 678 & n.2 (2011) (arguing that all trial motions are strategic, and judges
ought to rule on the merits of attorney disqualification motions without regard to the trial strategy of the
movant).
231. See Linda Ann Winslow, Comment, Federal Courts and Attorney DisqualificationMotions: A
Realistic Approach to Conflicts ofInterest, 62 WASH. L. REV. 863, 876-77 (1987).
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would, arguably, give insurers an improper ability to control attorneys' ability to
practice. As explained by one notable commentator:
Broad conflict rules create the danger that [attorneys] will be manipulated
by giant corporate clients to create conflicts of interest among all of the best available
lawyers, thus blockading legal talent from potential adversaries ... Overly restrictive
conflict rules [in small communities] might mean that only the most substantial of
small community clients would have effective freedom in choosing counsel.23 2
In Atlanta InternationalInsurance Co. v. Bell, the Michigan Supreme Court
considered, for the first time at the state level, whether an insurer had standing to
233
assert a conflict of interest challenge against an attorney representing an insured.
A judgment was subsequently entered against Securities Services, whose primary
insurer, Atlanta, was required to satisfy.23 4 Atlanta then filed suit against Bell and
Hertler alleging malpractice for having failed to raise comparative fault as a
defense. 23 5
In a motion for summary judgment, Bell acknowledged that his failure to
23 6
plead comparative fault constituted a breach of the professional standard of care.
He argued, however, that because no attomey-client relationship existed between the
parties, his sole duty was to his client, the insured.23 7 The trial court agreed with Bell
and dismissed the case. 2 38 After Atlanta appealed, the Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that "[n]o attomey-client relationship exists between an insurance
company and the attorney representing the insurance company's insured.... Rather,
an attorney's sole loyalty and duty is owed to the client alone, the client being the
insured, not the insurance company. "239
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that although something
less than an attomey-client relationship existed between the insurance company and
the defendant, social policy justified expanding the defendant's liability to include
actions by an insurance company where no conflict of interest existed. 2 40 The court
began its analysis by recognizing that liability policies typically include language
that "both obligate the insurer to provide the insured with a defense and entitle the
insurer to control the defense." 2 4 1 "The insurer typically hires, pays and consults with
defense counsel."24 2 "It has been appropriately recognized that '[defense counsel]
occupies a fiduciary relationship to the insured, as well as to the insurance
company. . . . "'243 The court also recognized, however, that the tripartite relationship

232. WOLFRAM, supra note 6 at 318.
233. Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1991).
234. Id at 296.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 448 N.W.2d 804, 805
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989)).
240. Id. at 297.
241. Id.
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among insured, insurer, and defense counsel often creates the possibility of a conflict
of interest.24 4 If a conflict arises, appointed counsel's primary duty of loyalty must
be to the client and not to the insurer. 2 45
Because defense counsel owed a fiduciary duty to the insured and the
insurer, and the insurer was ultimately responsible for satisfying a judgment arising
out of defense counsel's malpractice, special circumstances justified removing the
case from the general prohibition against third-party liability. 246 "Consequently,
because no conflict of interest existed between the insured and the insurer, 'the
attorney-client relationship, the interests of the client, the interest of the insurer, and
ultimately the public, which otherwise would absorb the costs of the malpractice, all
benefit from [the attorney's] exposure to suit [by the insurance company]. "'247
Finally, we must consider pure monetary costs. Significant scholarship has
analyzed the rising costs of litigation in general and insurance litigation specifically.
The uncertainty presented by these ethical issues delays cases and costs insurers and
insureds money. Most insurers' guidelines make clear the insurer will not pay for
defense counsel to research and analyze conflicts, so the cost of this frequentlyrequired and usually uncompensated work must be bome by the attorneys. And, it is
defense counsel who must answer for an ethical breach (even if inadvertent, because
the guidance is so sparse). Insureds, too, are burdened when actual or perceived
conflicts must be dealt with, and where defense counsel, whose relationships with
adverse insurers has triggered the conflict, is not in a position to give advice, and
where the policy of insurance does not require the insurer to hire counsel to assist
with this discrete problem.
The need for clear governing rules in this situation is in the interest of all
involved. Insurance defense counsels face potential malpractice liability. Clients
need to be fully informed of their rights and the attorneys' and insurers' interests,
and insurance companies need to be able to conform their hiring and management
practices to the ethical rules.
IV.

SOME GUIDANCE FOR A BETTER PATH FORWARD

The answer to the insurance defense ethical quandary is not an easy one.
And we don't mean to suggest that we have the panacea. But we do know that there
is a need for solutions.
Our case study is a good starting point for ideas. We outline below
principles that might be used to create a more detailed framework for dealing with
potential conflicts with third-party insurers.
As a preliminary note, in terms of the tripartite issue, it may be helpful to
recognize that for insurance defense attorneys, some loyalty is owed to both insurer
and insured. Having more nuanced guidance on what attorneys can appropriately do
for insurers and insureds without raising conflict issues would alleviate a lot of the
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confusion in this area. Specialized rules might need to depart from the traditional
standards in defining conflicts in these situations.
A statutory or rule-based scheme should also make clear whether, when a
liability insurer retains defense counsel to defend an insured, the only attorney client
relationship established is that between the insured and defense counsel. The scheme
should thus explicitly clarify whether an attorney-client relationship is established
between the liability insurer and defense counsel merely as a result of the insurer's
retention of defense counsel to represent the insured. We would suggest that, given
the Model Rules' preference for not creating an automatic relationship, that insurers
and defense counsel not have an automatic relationship. But a clear rule either way
will help.
Next, the scheme should address whether a mere pre-existing attorneyclient relationship between defense counsel and the insurer for an adverse party in
litigation constitutes a conflict of interest for defense counsel.
The scheme should also address the impacts of defending an insured under
a reservation of rights-and how to address the potential conflicts of interest claims
stemming from this situation. For example, the scheme should detail requirements
for defense counsel to follow when defending an insured under a reservation of
rights, such as confidentiality requirements so that the insurer cannot use defense
counsel to mine facts to use against the insured in later coverage litigation.
A scheme should similarly clarify that insurers may not expect defense
counsel to assist in its investigation and analysis of coverage defenses while
representing the insured-and that the insurer shall defer to defense counsel's
professional judgment in declining to share information which defense counsel
reasonably believes is confidential and which may bear on the insurer's coverage
defenses.
The scheme should make clear, consistent with the Model Rules, that the
insured shall have the right to control her defense, including all decisions related to
conducting discovery, motion practice, and trial.
The scheme should also address the common dispute about whether an
insured has the right to select her own defense counsel paid for by the insured. This
is an important issue and creates endless litigation across the country.
The scheme should also address the scope of defense counsel's obligations
to the insured. This includes defense counsel's obligations to provide timely and
updated reporting on the facts underlying the dispute; the relevant claims and
defenses; the plan of action for discovery, investigation and trial, including a budget;
the potential verdict exposure in the event of trial; the chance of prevailing at such a
trial; the potential allocation of fault among the various parties to the action; and any
other material information reasonably needed by the insurer and the insured to assess
their respective exposure in the action. Another common question where guidance
would be welcome is whether, and the extent to which, defense counsel is obligated
to provide advice regarding potential affirmative claims for relief like counterclaims,
cross-claims, third-party claims or otherwise. While it is well-settled that the insurer
is not required to fund, as part of the defense provided under the policy, the
prosecution of affirmative claims for relief, the fact of the matter is that the work
required to prosecute such claims often substantially overlaps with defense tasks,
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and the insurer may directly or indirectly benefit from the pursuit of such claims.
Guidance here would be helpful.
A scheme must also address how settlement offers are handled. Insurance
policies often detail the parties' various rights to control or consent to settlement
offers. And defense counsel need to know how these contractual obligations interact
with their ethical duties to allow their client to control the litigation.
Then, of course, the scheme should address what to do with defense
counsel's potential interests related to third-parties. The scheme should clarify
whether the mere fact that defense counsel may have an existing or prior relationship
with a liability insurer providing a defense to one or more of the other parties to the
action will itself constitute a conflict of interest for defense counsel, and if not, under
what circumstances it will.
Related to these third-party issues, the scheme should consider whether
defense counsel's relationship with other insurers or parties in the action must be
disclosed to the insured-when, whether the insured must consent to continued
representation, and what, precisely, should be disclosed.
The scheme should also explain whether defense counsel has obligations to
inform or seek consent from defense counsel's non-party clients when those clients'
interests might be put into issue-like when defense counsel proposes a course of
action in a case that might affect the interests of a non-party insurer-client.
Our proposal is just a starting point-the takeaway, we hope, is that states
should consider taking a more measured, careful look at how insurance defense
attorneys are regulated and give them more guidance about how to practice law in
this complex web of ethical duties.
We suggest a scheme that does not result in per se conflicts or
disqualifications. Of course, lawyers will still be responsible for fully advocating
their clients' cases. So, for example, if a lawyer decides not to pursue an insurerclient because of personal loyalties-the attorney would be violating ethical rules of
loyalty to the current client.
On the other hand, we would also propose that attorneys are free to
voluntarily withdraw anytime their representation of an insured places them in the
position of taking adverse steps against an insurer-client. This gives attorneys the
ability to police themselves if a material limitation (such as confidences or personal
loyalties) may interfere with their representation.2 48 While many courts and
authorities are concerned about whether insurance defense attorneys are "ethical"
in fact insurance defense attorneys, like most attorneys, are highly competent. 2 49
While courts have the ultimate say in granting attorney withdrawals, our proposed
rule framework makes clear the preference for allowing attorneys in these situations
to be released.

248.

See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 6.12, at 6-33 (4th ed. 2017) ("[L]awyers are members of society
too, and should be given outlets for exercise of their own moral autonomy, lest they become mere legal
technicians or automatons."); Bruce A. Green, Lawyers' Professional Independence: Overrated or
Undervalued?,46 AKRON L. REV. 599 (2013) (discussing lawyer independence).
249. Nancy Lewis, Lawyers' Liability to ThirdParties:The Ideology ofAdvocacy Reframed, 66 OR.
L. REV. 801, 832 (1987) ("Most attorneys are competent, ethical, and feel unfairly maligned when
examples of vicious, sensational advocacy are publicized.").

